Organizational Slack and Managerial Attention to Risk: Impact on an Organization's Experience with Harmful Surprises by Fox, Corey
   ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND MANAGERIAL 
ATTENTION TO RISK:  IMPACT ON AN 




   By 
   COREY FOX 
   Bachelor of Arts Economics 
   St. Ambrose University 
   Davenport, IA 
   2001 
 
   Master of Science Finance  
   DePaul University 
   Chicago, IL 
   2008 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
   July, 2014  
ii 
 
   ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND MANAGERIAL 
ATTENTION TO RISK:  IMPACT ON AN 
ORGANIZATION'S EXPERIENCE WITH HARMFUL 
SURPRISES  
      




Dr. Scott Johnson 
Dissertation Adviser 
   Dr. Timothy Hart 
 
   Dr. James Pappas 
 
   Dr. Betty Simkins 
iii 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee 
members or Oklahoma State University. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
There are many people that deserve my sincerest thanks and appreciation that I would 
like to acknowledge.  First and foremost, to my wife, thank-you for supporting me when I 
told you I wanted to 'go back to school.'  You sacrificed so much for something you knew 
was important to me and for that, I am forever grateful.  I love you and thank you.   
 
To my son Cooper, you are daddy's inspiration.  Everything I do, day in and day out, is 
for you first.  I will always remember the time spent with you sleeping on my shoulder 
while I read articles preparing this dissertation.  Thank-you for being my biggest 
inspiration and fan, I love you. 
 
To my parents, siblings, and nephews, thank-you for all of your unwavering love and 
support.  No matter the challenge, or how difficult times may be, I know that I can count 
on you to be in my corner.  I am very lucky to have been blessed with such an amazing 
family.  I love you guys!    
 
To my friends and fellow doctoral students, thank-you for all of your encouragement, 
support, and (most important of all) your friendship.  I have been fortunate to have met so 
many great people over the course of the program and hope that these friendships endure 
beyond our time together at OSU. 
 
To my committee, thank-you for all of your insights and guidance throughout this 
process.  I am grateful that each of you were willing to support me on this journey and 
enjoyed working with each of you.   
 
To Dr. Timothy Hart, thank you for being a great mentor and role model.  It seems like 
only yesterday that we were meeting for the first time at your office in Stillwater--you an 
incoming Assistant Professor and me a brand new doctoral student.  Thank you for your 
kindness and involving me in your research--it has taught me so much.  Thank-you for 
everything! 
 
Finally, to Dr. Scott Johnson, thank you for being a great advisor and mentor.  A doctoral 
student could not have asked for anybody better to chair their dissertation committee.  
You have taught me so much about the research process--I cannot begin to express in 
words how important that was for me.  Anytime I had a question or wanted to talk, you 
were willing to meet with me.  Even when you were busy, you would take time out to sit 
down, talk through, and help me out with any issues.  For all of your time, energy, 
commitment, insights, guidance, and help throughout this process, I am forever grateful.  
Thank you.  
iv 
 
Name: COREY FOX   
 
Date of Degree: JULY, 2014 
  
Title of Study: ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND MANAGERIAL ATTENTION TO 
RISK:  IMPACT ON AN ORGANIZATION'S EXPERIENCE WITH 
HARMFUL SURPRISES 
 
Major Field: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (MANAGEMENT) 
 
Abstract: Many organizations today are faced with an increasing number of risks related 
to their internal and external environments.  When these risks manifest, the results can be 
disastrous.  Recently, as these disasters have increased in frequency and scale, 
researchers have tried to understand what role risk management plays in helping 
companies withstand the impact of these 'risk events.'  In this study, I explore two 
theoretical domains in management research which are amenable to understanding risk 
management from a managerial perspective.  Drawing upon research in organizational 
theory and managerial cognition, I formulate a model which examines whether a 
company's slack resources or the managerial attention allocated to matters of risk, impact 
the likelihood that companies experience a 'risk event.'  I gather data on over 400 
companies over six years to test my assertions.  Results suggest that facets of managerial 
attention--mainly how many diverse categories of risk managers attend to as well as the 
amount of attention devoted to their external environment--reduced the likelihood of 
experiencing a 'risk event.'  The findings of my study contribute to research in 
management in two ways.  First, my research extends existing theory in management by 
exploring how organization's handle risk.  Second, I test my assertions by using a data 
source previously unexplored in research on risk in the field of management--suggesting 
that this new data source may be fruitful in future research endeavors.   
 
My dissertation is organized as follows.  First, I introduce my research topic and research 
question.  Second, I review the literature on risk management, slack and the attention-
based view of organizations.  Third, I introduce my theoretical arguments and hypotheses 
for testing.  Fourth, I discuss my method for testing my hypotheses as well as discuss my 
data source, variables and analytical technique.  Fifth, I present the results of my analysis.  
Last, I conclude with an overview of my findings, the limitations of my research and 
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How companies handle the catastrophic impacts of downside risk has become a hot topic 
for organizations in recent years.  Numerous high profile companies have either incurred 
catastrophic losses or outright failures as a result of their strategies in response to risk.  
These cases have called attention to the role that risk plays in organizations and the 
importance of strategies to mitigate risk.  As a result of these events, government 
regulators, as well as other institutions such as stock exchanges and ratings agencies, are 
urging (and in some cases requiring) organizations to focus more attention on how they 
handle risk.  For example, after the highly publicized collapse of Enron, the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was formulated and a year later, the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) updated its corporate governance rules for listing companies.  These 
new rules required audit committees to discuss the strategies the organization is using to 
assess and manage risk (NYSE, 2003).  More recently, the collapse of companies like 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in the financial sector has reinvigorated the debate 
about the importance of managing risk.  Rating agencies such as A.M. Best, Moody‘s, 
and Standard & Poor‘s have started including a component in their rating system which 
grades companies on their risk management strategies.  
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 Although the topic of risk and how organizations handle risk is a timely one, scholars 
would be hard pressed to find much in the way of empirical academic research on this 
specific topic in the management literature.  This is peculiar given that how organizations 
respond to risk lies at the very heart of strategic management concepts like organizational 
alignment and adaptation (Andrews, 1980).  Managing risk has, instead, been examined in 
more detail in other fields such as finance under the terms ‗risk management‘ or ‗enterprise 
risk management.‘  While research in fields like finance has begun to probe the surface on 
managing risk in organizations, scholars exploring this new line of research have run into a 
number of challenges which has constrained the dissemination of results to other fields.  One 
such limitation is that the research questions which are explored answer questions specific to 
the domain of finance, such as whether risk management is valued by financial markets and 
how stock prices react to the announcement of risk management personnel.  Recent research, 
as well as newer conceptualizations of risk management however, has suggested that one of 
the chief benefits of managing risk is to help organizations avoid being surprised by changes 
in its environment which can cause harm to the organization.  I explore the latter in this study 
building on concepts from organization theory and strategic management. 
 Risk has a storied past, not only in organizational research but in social science in 
general.  Once thought to be a matter of fate, humans have recognized over time that 
uncertain future events are something that can be planned for, and hence their outcomes can 
be managed (Bernstein, 1996).  One difficulty in studying risk is that there are numerous 
definitions of risk (Aven, 2010).  Many of these definitions are dependent upon the context 
and discipline from which risk is being examined.  For example, risk from an economics 
standpoint differs from that of a finance standpoint.  In economics, Knight (1921) 
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distinguished risk from uncertainty.  Risk, he suggested, is measurable uncertainty.  Risks are 
uncertain in their occurrence but decision makers know the probabilities of their occurrence 
and the outcomes associated with each occurrence.  Uncertainty, on the other hand, is 
immeasurable uncertainty where decision makers do not know probabilities of events or the 
outcomes associated with them.  In finance, risk is commonly associated with volatility, or 
variance—a statistical artifact, where the more volatile the asset (e.g. an investment or a 
portfolio), the more risky it is (and hopefully the more return gained) (Markowitz, 1952).  In 
both fields, risks can result in either gain or loss.  These definitions are consistent with the 
notion that risk is objective and something which is quantifiable.      
 The conceptualizations of risk used in economics and finance have been criticized 
because they fail to take into account the subjective, and behavioral aspect of risk (Miller & 
Leiblein, 1996).  Those in charge of organizations are limited in their abilities to process the 
vast amount of information that they are confronted with from their environments (Cyert & 
March, 1963).  The environment that managers operate within is never certain and not always 
amenable to probability calculations and quantification (Miller, 2009).  Organizations operate 
in a highly complex and integrated system where new contingencies are always emerging as 
a result of changes in the firm‘s internal and external environments (Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985).  This makes it difficult for managers to predict what other managers and organizations 
are going to do, and almost impossible to develop a probability distribution of the potential 
outcomes associated with those actions.  In this sense, risk is subjective—it is shaped by the 
context managers operate within and by the situations that managers experience (Miller, 
2009).    
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 As a result, a manager‘s definition of what constitutes risk differs from many 
academic conceptualizations of risk.  In addition to uncertainty, managers also associate risk 
with poor performance, adverse outcomes, or losses (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; 
March & Shapira, 1987; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Ruefli, Collins & Lacugna, 1999).  Top 
managers in organizations are tasked by shareholders with one overarching objective—to 
create and achieve competitive advantage in order to attain an aspired level of performance.  
A failure to achieve these levels can result in unfavorable consequences for both the 
organization and the manager(s) that operate them.  Thus, managers are preoccupied with 
loss aversion, not variance aversion (Miller & Leiblein, 1996).  To managers, a risk 
represents something which is uncertain to occur but that can result in the organization 
failing to reach a certain level of performance, or incurring a loss.  This type of risk has been 
referred to as downside risk and is also consistent with how lay people define risk and how 
risk is defined in the dictionary (Merriam-Webster, 2012).  In this study I will define 
downside risk as the potential for loss as a result of uncertain contingencies in the 
organization‘s environment.  Similar definitions have been used in the field of strategy as 
well as recent empirical work that has focused on developing more accurate measures of risk 
(Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Ruefli et al., 1999).  In this study, I use the words ‗risk‘ and 
‗downside risk‘ interchangeably. 
 Managing risk has been posited to be one of the most important functions of 
managers (Fayol, 1949).  Managers, and particularly top managers, are counted on to make 
decisions about strategies the organization should implement given their analysis of the 
numerous contingencies in the organization‘s environment.  Managers are counted on to 
make decisions that are consistent with what they believe will help them achieve competitive 
5 
 
advantage and help them continue operations (Andrews, 1980).  One important decision is 
how to handle risk.  While research in finance has scratched the surface of risk management, 
existing studies have done an inadequate job of empirically examining how organizations 
withstand and avoid downside risk, and more specifically the impact of harmful surprises.   A 
new viewpoint is needed to answer this question.   
 The traditional viewpoint from the world of finance is that risk management should 
be left to individual security holders and not to managers of organizations (Markowitz, 
1952).  However, theoretical arguments have disputed this view and have argued that 
managing risk from within the organization can be valuable (Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; 
Bettis, 1983; Meulbroeck, 2002; Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Stulz, 1996).  One of its most 
important benefits is that risk management should help an organization achieve its goals by 
helping managers avoid pitfalls and surprises, and by extension the costs and losses 
associated with them (Aven, 2010).  From an empirical perspective however, this premise 
has never been tested.  Existing studies have focused more on whether or not financial 
markets react to the announcement of companies hiring chief risk officers (CRO) (Beasley, 
Pagach & Warr, 2008), the impact of risk management programs on Tobin‘s Q (Hoyt & 
Liebenberg, 2011) and risk management‘s impact on earnings volatility (Pagach & Warr, 
2010).  Results of these studies have been inconclusive. 
 The lack of empirical support in existing studies may come from numerous sources.  
As I will explain more thoroughly in the literature review, current research is problematic 
because of measurement issues, construct validity, and industry-specific samples.  
Furthermore, the outcome variables used in the current studies fail to address one of the most 
touted benefits of risk management.  Risk management should help organizations avoid 
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being harmed by surprises that are the result of shifts in the organization‘s environment 
(Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 2004).  Organizational surprises are 
sudden encounters with a phenomenon which the organization had not previously given 
much consideration.  To be taken by surprise means that organizations are taken ―unawares,‖ 
or without preparation (Cunha, Clegg & Kamoche, 2006).   
 Harmful organizational surprises, better termed 'risk events' (Kasperson, Renn, 
Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson & Ratick, 1988) are the manifestations of risk which 
can surprise a company and which may result in catastrophe, such as large losses or company 
failure.  Large losses and failure are problematic for organizations because they drain the 
organization of important resources which can be used to make investments that can improve 
shareholder value over the long run (Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Sprecher & Pertl, 1983; Stulz, 
1996).  Harmful organizational surprises, or risk events, occur because organizational and 
managerial knowledge is necessarily always incomplete (Hayek, 1945) and the environment 
in which organizations operate is always changing, often uncertain, and mostly ambiguous 
(Cunha et al., 2006).  Uncertainty in the organization‘s environment introduces an element of 
risk for managers.  When these risks introduce the possibility of loss for organizations, they 
are considered downside risks.  When these downside risks materialize, organizations can 
experience adverse consequences.  The key for managers is to figure out how to minimize the 
impact that these events have on their organizations.  One way to do this is to understand 
how companies are best able to withstand and avoid these surprises. 
 Early work in organization theory, as well as more recent work in managerial 
cognition, provides a starting point for such an analysis.  Early organization theory scholars 
(e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; Thompson, 1967) have suggested that organizations attempt to 
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reduce uncertainty and build up buffers around its technical core to insulate itself from 
changes in its environment.  One such buffer is organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981).  In 
addition to slack resources, managers can make more informed decisions and formulate 
better plans about risk by allocating more attention (Ocasio, 1997) to potential downside 
risks.  Drawing on these two literatures, I argue that both slack and managerial attention 
devoted to risk will help us understand which companies are best able to withstand and avoid 
harmful surprises.   
Research Question and Contribution 
In this study I look to address the following research question: 
How can organizations withstand or avoid risk events? 
I believe this research makes several contributions to the existing literature in management as 
well as work exploring risk management.  First, this is an initial attempt at empirically testing 
new theoretical ideas surrounding the effectiveness of risk management.  Existing research 
on managing risk from other fields, such as finance, has important limitations which reduce 
its generalizability.  As a result of these existing limitations (which are outlined in more 
detail below), the empirical findings in these studies have been inconclusive.  I apply a 
management lens to this important topic by examining the role that slack resources, as well 
as managerial attention, play in helping organizations withstand the effects of downside risks.  
By doing this I provide a new perspective built on management theory which has been 
missing from the existing literature.   
 Second, in conjunction with examining risk management utilizing a management 
lens, I examine an outcome variable not examined before in the existing literature. Existing 
research looking at this topic has focused on the value that markets place on having dedicated 
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personnel to oversee risk (Beasley et al., 2008) and changes in firm performance (Pagach & 
Warr, 2010).  As important as these outcomes are they only assess the valuation of risk 
management.  One of the most critical measures for examining whether strategies to handle 
risk are effective has been unexamined.  An important benefit of developing strategies to 
mitigate the potential negative effects of risk is to help organizations avoid harmful surprises, 
or risk events (COSO, 2004).  In this study, I address this shortcoming in the existing 
literature and examine risk events.     
 Finally, I also believe this study makes a methodological contribution.  I expand upon 
this in more detail in the methods section, but the data source I use for testing several of my 
predictions is new to the field of strategy.  In 2005, the SEC required organizations to start 
divulging to its shareholders the key risks that managers believe may cause the organization 
to fall short of its performance objectives.  Companies have used section 1A of the yearly 10-
K filings with the SEC to satisfy this requirement.  While prior work in strategy has used 
contextual data from company 10-K filings, no management research has utilized the unique 
information that is contained in this section, and only a handful of papers across all of the 
business related fields have examined the information contained in this section (e.g. 
Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele 2012; Huang, 2011).  While some financial analysts 
have argued that the risk factors divulged to investors in annual reports are merely window 
dressing and boilerplate, empirical work has found that the information contained within this 
newly created section does provide unique and important information to shareholders about 
company risk and paints an accurate picture of the risks that organizations face (Campbell et 
al., 2012).  My study is the first that I am aware of in the field of strategic management that 
uses this information source to assess managerial attention to risk.      
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 To examine my research question in more detail, my study is laid out as follows:  
first, I briefly review some of the early organization theory literature on slack in 
organizations, risk management, and relevant literature from the attention-based literature.  
Second, I formulate my hypotheses using research from the attention-based view and 
prescriptive work in the risk management domain.  Finally, I discuss my method for data 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE & HYPOTHESES 
Risk Management 
In order to understand how companies avoid the perils of downside risks, I will briefly 
review research from existing risk management literature that is strongly rooted in the 
field of finance.  This literature is currently the best source scholars have for 
understanding how managers should handle risk in organizations.  In this section, I will 
briefly review some important developments in risk management research, the process by 
which organizations manage risk, the benefits of managing risk, and current findings 
from empirical work.  I will also discuss the limitations of existing risk management 
research which will highlight the importance of introducing a new perspective.    
Recent Developments 
The practice of risk management has been around for centuries (Bernstein, 1996) but only 
recently (the past decade or two) has it caught the attention of academics and those in the 
popular press.  According to a recent review by Verbano & Venturini (2011), risk 
management originated as a way for organizations to reduce the costs associated with 
insurance.  The risks managers tended to focus on were pure risks, or risks that could be 
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insured.  Changes in the insurance market in the 80‘s caused managers to rethink risk 
management as being purely based in the world of insurance as insurance rates began to 
rise dramatically.  In the 90s the evolution of financial markets and the increasing 
scrutiny on corporate profits caused managers to once again reassess their views on risk 
and what risk management entailed.  Financial and strategic risks became the soup de 
jour, while insurable risks faded into the background.  Managers began looking to 
financial instruments such as futures, options, and swaps to manage risk.  After the 
corporate failures of the late 90s and early 2000s, risk management was again in the 
spotlight.  While financial and strategic risks still occupied the attention of managers, the 
discipline of risk management had matured and expanded to now incorporate the domain 
of operational risks.   
 Much of the early prescriptive work focusing on risk management in business 
organizations saw managers formulating risk management plans around individual 
risks—such as insurable risks and financial risks, in isolation from one another.  This 
approach to risk management was considered to be the ‗silo‘ approach of managing risk 
(Fraser & Simkins, 2010) where risks were seen as disparate and unconnected to each 
other.  This was problematic because over time researchers and practitioners saw that 
many risks that seemed to be unique were actually correlated.  Thus, managing one type 
of risk was having an impact on other risks that happened to be related.  In some 
instances, risk management efforts were being duplicated which caused an increase in 
expenses associated with risk management.  In other cases, different functional areas 
were each operating alone and developing separate strategies to handle the same risks.  
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On occasion, this resulted in strategies that cancelled each other out instead of working 
together to manage risk.   
 Scholars and practitioners realized that to successfully manage risk, risk 
management processes needed to take the correlated nature of risks into account (Miller, 
1992).  This called for a more complex and holistic alternative for managing risk.  
Numerous holistic risk management initiatives have been developed.  For instance, 
enterprise risk management (ERM) has caught on in work on risk management in finance 
(e.g. Fraser & Simkins, 2010) while integrated risk management (IRM) and strategic risk 
management (SRM) has found a (albeit very small) following in some management 
circles (e.g. Clarke & Varma, 1999; Miller, 1998; Miller & Waller, 2003).  Regardless of 
the name, it has been relatively well accepted that for the best results, risk should be 
managed across the organization, in a more holistic way, with input from all 
organizational members in both a top down and bottom up process.  Nevertheless, despite 
this widely held perception in risk management practice, the development and testing of 
related theories to test this topic has been lacking in management research.  
Risk Management Process 
 There are many scholars and practitioners, particularly in the field of finance, who 
have put forth processes for helping managers manage risk more effectively.  For 
instance Shortreed (2010) has suggested the risk management process consists of 
establishing the context where the process will be carried out, assessing the appropriate 
risks, treating those risks that are considered important, continually monitoring and 
reviewing risks and the risk management process in general, and communicating the risk 
management process with others in the organization.  Shenkir and colleagues (2010) have 
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suggested the process consists of first clarifying the organizations strategic and financial 
objectives, work to identify important risks, assessing the risks that have been identified, 
taking action on the risks, monitoring risks over time, and communicating with managers 
across the organization to ensure the process is up to date.  Frame (2003) has also 
articulated a process for managing risk that similarly includes the steps of planning for 
risk, identifying key risks, examining the impact of potential risks, developing risk-
handling strategies, and finally monitoring and controlling risks.   
 Chapman (2011) has suggested that risk management follows a similar process as 
Shortreed (2010) where the process consists of establishing the context where risk 
management is going to take place, risk identification, analyzing the risks that have been 
identified and classifying them, evaluating the potential impact of the risks that have been 
identified, generating strategies to treat the risks, monitoring and reviewing risks and the 
risk treatment strategies over time making change when necessary, and finally, 
communicating and consulting with those responsible for carrying out risk management 
to make it more effective over time.   
 Examining just these few works on risk management it is readily apparent that the 
process is fairly broad and contains several well accepted and universal steps.  For 
instance, each scholar has acknowledged the importance of first identifying the key risks 
facing the organization and addressing how they fit with the organization‘s current 
objectives.  Second, some type of assessment and analysis of the identified risks is 
undertaken to determine which risks should be managed.  Third, strategies are developed 
and implemented to manage these risks.  Finally, the process is reviewed over time to 
ensure that it is still working with its intended purpose.  While these steps may be similar 
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across firms, each firm‘s risk management strategy is going to be unique to that 
organization.  This is because organizations have very different resource bases (Barney, 
1991) which a) will be impacted differently by the numerous internal and external 
contingencies the organization faces, and b) which allow them to react and carry out risk 
management strategies.  Additionally, since risk management is supposed to be highly 
intertwined with the organization‘s overall strategy (Beasley & Frigo, 2010; Dickinson, 
2001; Mehr & Forbes, 1973) it will invariably be different and unique for each firm, 
dependent upon how each firm hopes to achieve a competitive advantage. 
Benefits of Risk Management 
 Scholars in finance have argued that managing risk helps reduce the variability of 
corporate earnings, reduce the organization‘s tax liability, and provides decision makers 
with important information about its environment for making better future decisions 
(Meulbroek, 2002; Nocco & Stulz, 2006).  However, from a managerial perspective, one 
of the most important benefits of risk management is to help organizations minimize or 
avoid surprises that can hurt the organization (Mehr & Forbes, 1973).  These surprises 
usually assume the form of low probability, high impact events that can result in 
catastrophe for organizations and can result in financial hardships.  More specifically, 
these surprise events can negatively impact the organization‘s financial position such that 
internally generated funds will be drained and will no longer be available to invest in 
positive net present value projects which aspire to enhance shareholder wealth (Amit & 
Wernerfelt, 1990; Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Stulz, 1996).  These funds are important for 
organizations because they are often times the least expensive and most flexible form of 
funding for company projects.   
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 Frame (2003) has suggested that the reasons the aforementioned benefits (i.e. 
fewer adverse surprises and preserved value creating resources) accrue to organizations 
that implement risk management programs are two-fold.  First, when organizations have 
risk management processes in place, managers can make higher quality decisions because 
they have more information at their disposal than managers that do not take part in the 
risk management process (Mehr & Forbes, 1973).  Managers undergo a detailed process 
of scanning their environment (Hambrick, 1981) for important pieces of information.  
This information is brought together and expanded upon with activities like 
brainstorming sessions with department heads (Frame, 2003) and doing exercises like 
creating risk checklists (Chapman, 2011).  As a result, managers can formulate strategies 
that are built on a broader base of information with particular attention paid to possible 
sources of harm from the organization‘s internal and external environment.  Managers 
can then choose to implement strategies that preemptively avoid or transfer risk, or they 
can draw upon general courses of action designed before an event occurs that may be 
more appropriate given the situation.   
 Research has suggested that these activities designed to broaden the base of 
information for managerial decision making can be beneficial regardless of whether they 
result in formal or informal risk management plans.  Scholars have found evidence that 
just being mindful of the multitude of potential risks in the environment can enhance 
managerial confidence when it comes to making decisions and can serve as an important 
source of information to make better informed decisions when a risk materializes 
(Christopher, Mena, Khan & Yurt, 2011; Miller, 1998; Shenkir, et. al., 2010).  
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 Second, as a result of more intelligent decisions about risk, having risk 
management plans in place helps those responsible for taking action on risk to act swiftly 
and confidently since they have undergone a rigorous analysis with other decision 
makers.  Without at least a general plan or strategy in place (formal or informal), 
managers are left to choose the first best alternative in the heat of the moment as opposed 
to organizations where managers have a general idea of the appropriate and acceptable 
actions to take (Simon, 1947).  This can help to reduce the impact that a risk can have if it 
does materialize.  For instance, decision makers in organizations that do not discuss 
potential risks and how to handle them may lack information about alternatives if an 
event occurs.  As a result, they may hold off on making any decisions to deal with risk, 
thus allowing the risk to result in even greater damage to the organization.     
 In theory then, risk management has some very important benefits for 
organizations.  Unfortunately, empirical work examining what if any, the actual benefits 
of risk management are, has not confirmed the value that risk management has been 
posited to create (Beasley, Pagach & Warr, 2008; Pagach & Warr, 2010)
1
.   
Empirical Work on the Benefits of Risk Management     
 Empirical work examining the benefits of risk management has been sparse and 
the results have been inconclusive.  For example, Hoyt & Liebenberg (2011) examined 
insurance companies located in the United States and found that the stock of companies 
that had risk management policies in place was given a risk management ―premium‖ (i.e. 
                                                          
1
 There is a separate literature which looks at specific risk management tactics, such as hedging, which has 
been more conclusive (e.g. Campello et al., 2011; Carter et al., 2006; Smithson & Simkins, 2005).  
However, the interest here is on the overall risk management function in organizations and the multitude of 




the stock was more valuable) of up to 20% more than those companies that did not have 
those policies.  In the field of management, Amit & Wernerfelt (1990) found that 
reducing business-related risk benefits stockholders by helping firms operate more 
efficiently, thus improving the organization‘s cash flows and value.  This is similar to the 
theoretical argument made by Stulz (1996) and Nocco & Stulz (2006) in that risk 
management is important to preserve internally generated cash so that organizations can 
invest in positive net present value creating projects.  Unfortunately, they could only 
confirm their predictions through an indirect method which did not specifically test the 
link between business risk and improving cash flow.   
 Alternatively, there are several studies that seem to refute the posited benefits of 
risk management.  For example, Beasley and colleagues (2008) examined equity market 
reactions to announcements made by organizations stating they had placed an executive 
in charge of overseeing risk management.  Through their analysis they found that the 
market did not react to these announcements, calling into question whether shareholders 
found risk management to be beneficial for organizations.  Similarly, Pagach & Warr 
(2010) examine risk management adoption and firm performance.  They find that while 
some firms experience reduced earnings volatility, there is no value enhancing impact 
from adopting a risk management program.  Not only do these studies give a mixed 
message about the value of risk management, but they do not examine a central 
prediction in risk management research—does risk management assist firms in avoiding 
risk events so that they can continue to invest in value creating projects? 
Limitations of Existing Risk Management Studies 
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 I believe there are two levels of problems within existing risk management 
research which has made it a difficult topic to empirically test.  On one level, there is an 
inherent difficulty in measurement of key constructs.  More specifically, it is difficult to 
assess whether organizations are using risk management processes in the first place.  This 
problem cascades into the problems of existing empirical studies on the topic.   I will 
briefly outline these two issues below. 
 Risk management by its nature is very difficult to study for two reasons.  First, the 
presence of risk management can be difficult, if not impossible to identify through 
secondary data sources.  This issue arises because risk management is going to be highly 
intertwined with the organization‘s strategy and thus, difficult to untangle and isolate 
(Beasley & Frigo, 2010; Dickinson, 2001).  For example, risks presented by a competitor 
expanding into an organization‘s market space should be identified by management.  
Managers should then take this information and incorporate it into the organization‘s 
existing strategy (Andrews, 1980; Porter, 1980).  Viewing this move from outside of the 
organization via traditional secondary data sources, there is no way to assess that 
managers made changes to strategy based upon their assessment of downside risk 
presented by the competitor or for other reasons.  This makes it difficult to single out 
what is being done explicitly to handle risk and what is done for other motivations. 
 The second issue is that for some organizations, managing risk may be a valuable 
capability which helps create competitive advantages (Barney, 1991).  For these 
organizations, risk management is a way to gain a competitive edge over industry peers 
(Clarke & Varma, 1999) and thus it is highly unlikely that information about its risk 
management practices will be divulged.  For example, Southwest Airlines was notorious 
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for having an enormously successful fuel hedging program in the 2000s (New York 
Times, 2008).  While the company disclosed very general information (only that which 
was required by law) in their annual reports, they never went into great detail about how 
and why they decided to take the positions they did and how they went about 
implementing their positions.  That information was proprietary and a source of 
competitive advantage over other industry participants.  To this point, most other airlines 
hedged their fuel price but none were as successful at managing the risk associated with 
fuel price as Southwest.     
 These two issues, the difficulty of measurement and the desire to retain 
proprietary knowledge, create circumstances which make it difficult to empirically 
examine risk management.  Specifically, scholars interested in exploring this topic have 
to be creative in their way of identifying risk management in organizations.  
Unfortunately, their creativity has introduced additional problems.  First, it can be argued 
that construct validity is fairly weak in existing studies.  Risk management is argued to 
exist when the company has an executive(s) explicitly in charge of risk.  In research using 
that approach, the most commonly used proxy for risk management is whether the 
organization has a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or specific personnel that handle risk (e.g. 
Beasley et al., 2008; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Pagach & Warr, 2010, 2011).  
Liebernberg & Hoyt (2003) have argued that because risk management programs are 
often times not disclosed, simple measures of risk management are used as signals of risk 
management usage.  One of those simple measures is the announcement of the CRO.  
This is problematic however, because using CROs leaves out the possibility that 
organizations are doing something with risk management but not explicitly identifying 
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one executive to be in charge of that initiative.  Organizations can shift risk management 
responsibilities to personnel throughout the organization, from other members of the top 
management team or to everyday employees.  This is a limitation of current risk 
management studies (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003).   
 An additional problem with using CRO announcements, or trying to identify 
specific risk management personnel, is that these positions are constrained to a relatively 
few industries.  The CRO position originated in the insurance and financial industries and 
has only recently begun to expand to other industries such as energy and manufacturing.  
As a result, most of the companies in these studies are from these relatively few 
industries (Beasley et al., 2008; Colquitt, Hoyt & Lee, 1999; Pagach & Warr, 2011) and 
sample sizes are very small (typically less than 150 organizations).  This lack of 
variability in industries creates external validity issues such that results can be misleading 
and insights gained can be quite limited.    
 A final limitation of existing studies is that they fail to address some of the most 
important theorized benefits of risk management.  One of the important benefits of risk 
management is to help organizations avoid being surprised by things which can cause 
harm to the organization.  Risk events that result in harmful surprises can drain the 
organization of important resources which can be used for investing in positive net 
present value (NPV) projects (Nocco & Stulz, 2006).  These resources are often the most 
cost effective and readily deployable resources that organizations have.  Not having them 
can be the difference between investing in projects that can improve shareholder wealth 
over the long-term and not investing in them.  Additionally, not having these resources 
can cause disruption to value creating activities and hurt the organization‘s ability to 
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continue its operations.  Empirical work assessing the benefits of risk management has 
overlooked its impact on an organization‘s experience with harmful surprises.   
 Instead, existing research has looked at other firm level outcomes such as firm 
performance.  For example, recent empirical work examining the benefits of risk 
management has used outcome variables which examined changes in firm performance 
(Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Pagach & Warr, 2010) and equity market returns around the 
announcement of a CRO (Beasley et al., 2008).  Simply assessing firm performance and 
firm value is inappropriate for concluding that risk management is or is not doing what it 
is intended to do.  Risk management may be working but it would not necessarily show 
up in improved financial performance or short-term stock return data.  Research looking 
at the benefits of risk management should be focusing less on risk management‘s 
contribution to firm performance and more on how organizations are able to withstand 
the impact of catastrophic downside risk.  Two streams of research in management have 
elements which are flexible for accommodating a risk management perspective.  
Research on organizational slack as well as managerial attention suggest that their 
presence may have risk-management properties--I explain this link in more detail next. 
Organizational Slack 
Early work in the field of organizational theory has suggested that organizations have 
ways of shielding itself from the unpredictable changes in its environment.  It is well 
accepted that organizations operate in complex and dynamic environments and that 
organizations face numerous contingencies from both inside and outside its boundaries.  
Indeed, Cyert & March (1963) argued that one of the organization‘s key objectives was 
to take action to reduce the uncertainty it faces from its environment, where the 
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environment consists of the market, the organization‘s suppliers, competitors, 
government agencies and the like.  Additionally, Thompson (1967) has posited that in 
order for organization‘s to maintain their effectiveness, it was important for organizations 
to buffer its technical core from threats emerging as a result of environmental shifts.  The 
technical core consists of the key processes and routines in organizations which surround 
its value creating activities.  It is important to keep the technical core intact and operating 
smoothly without interruptions so that organizations can carry out their strategies to 
achieve competitive advantage.  A changing environment threatens the technical core and 
represents a risk to the organization. 
 In the literature, one of the ways that organizations avoid uncertainty and buffer 
its technical core is through the accumulation of slack resources (Bourgeois, 1981).  
According to Cyert & March (1963), organizational slack resources are resources that are 
left over when the total amount of firm resources exceed the total necessary payments to 
sustain the organization‘s operations.  Bourgeois (1981:30) has defined slack as ―…that 
cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt 
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in 
policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment.‖  
In essence, slack is like an insurance policy for organizations against unforeseen change.  
Cyert & March (1963:43) have argued that ―when the environment becomes less 
favorable, organizational slack represents a cushion….More important, the cushion 
provided by organizational slack permits firms to survive in the face of adversity.‖ 
 Existing research examining slack has moved away from the traditional viewpoint 
that slack acts as a buffer against environmental change.  Newer research has instead 
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looked at how slack motivates search and the upside potential which can ensue.  In this 
research stream, slack has been viewed as an important source of organizational risk-
taking and change.  When organizations have slack resources they can use those 
resources to experiment with new activities and strategies (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & 
March, 1963) which are often considered risky.  For example, several studies have found 
a positive relationship between slack resources and research and development intensity in 
organizations (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003; O‘Brien, 2003).  Others have found 
that slack has a positive relationship with product exploration and exploitation (Voss, 
Sirdeshmukh & Voss, 2008) as well as with acquisition activity (Iyer & Miller, 2008).  
The underlying premise is that when organizations have excess resources they have more 
strategic flexibility to engage in risky activities that they normally might not. 
 While much work has focused on the slack--performance relationship (Daniel, 
Lohrke, Fornaciari & Turner, 2004), far less research has focused on slack and its role as 
a buffer against threats posed by risks.  To this point, very little research has examined 
the original intent explicated in early organization theory about the benefits of a build-up 
of slack resources in organizations.  For instance, Miller & Leiblein (1996) have argued 
that slack may have an impact on organizations‘ downside risk over medium-term time 
horizons, while Iyer & Miller (2008) have hinted that one of the reasons slack allows 
organizations to engage in risky behavior is because the slack resources protect 
organizations in case the decision to take risk turns out badly.  These studies do not, 
however, empirically examine the idea that slack buffers organizations and helps them 




Attention-Based View (ABV) 
In addition to the traditional organization theory suggestion that organizations have 
elements which can be used for buffering itself from risk, research in the managerial 
cognition literature may also be informative in helping to understand how organizations 
can avoid the impact of risk.  Managerial cognition research takes the stance that 
managers can significantly impact the value of organizations.  The underlying argument 
is that since important strategic decisions are made by a relatively small group of 
individuals at the top of the organizational hierarchy (Daft & Weick, 1984), it is 
important to understand how the cognition of these individuals can impact organizations 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  From a managerial cognition perspective, managers spend 
their time processing the vast amount of information that confronts them from both the 
internal and external environment (Walsh, 1995) in order to make decisions about an 
organization‘s strategy.  Unfortunately, as human beings, managers are cognitively 
constrained as opposed to completely rational in their ability to process and attend to all 
of the information they take in when trying to solve problems (Beck & Plowman, 2009; 
Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947). 
 Kiesler & Sproull (1982) have argued that to solve problems, managers engage in 
problem sensing.  Problem sensing is the cognitive process of noticing and constructing 
meaning about changes occurring in the organization‘s environment so that managers can 
make decisions and take actions.  Along these lines, Daft & Weick (1984) have argued 
that organizations are interpretive systems in which managers must make sense of, and 
interpret, the numerous different events that organizations encounter when trying to 
achieve its goals.  Managers take stimuli and events and attach meaning to these events 
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which then help them decide which types of actions to take (Dutton & Jackson, 1987).  
Daft & Weick (1984) have conceptualized this managerial activity as a tripartite 
information processing sequence that includes attention, interpretation, and action. 
 Ocasio (1997) however, argued that the three processes are so intertwined that 
trying to untangle them is not meaningful.  Instead, Ocasio (1997) encased these different 
processes in a multidimensional concept of attention.  The attention-based view (ABV) of 
organizations sees managers as boundedly rational information processors (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Simon, 1947).  Managers do not have unlimited cognitive abilities and 
resources and thus, are limited in how much attention they can devote to all of the 
different stimuli confronting the organization.  When trying to make decisions about the 
most appropriate strategies to implement, top decision makers in organizations are 
constantly being bombarded with numerous pieces of information from their internal and 
external environment (Kabanoff & Brown, 2008).  Because of the limits of managerial 
attention, managers must pick and choose which stimuli will be given more attention and 
which will receive considerably less attention (Cyert & March, 1963).   
 According to Ocasio (1997: 189), attention is ―the noticing, encoding, 
interpreting, and focusing of time and effort‖ by the organization‘s top decision makers 
on strategic issues (such as threats, opportunities, and problems) faced by the 
organization, as well as the solutions (responses) to those issues.  One of the key 
principles of the attention-based perspective is that what managers focus their limited 
attention resources on will impact the decisions and strategies they will enact.  This 
principle is called ‗focus of attention‘ and has been examined in numerous empirical 
studies.  Nadkarni & Barr (2008) argued that managerial focus of attention could be 
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defined as the degree to which manager‘s focus on some aspect(s) of the organization‘s 
environment as opposed to focusing on other aspects.  Furthermore, they argue that 
attention focus is important because it is a determinant of which issues, such as risk, will 
be included in the organization‘s future strategic decisions.  
Empirical Work on Attention 
Numerous empirical studies have examined managers‘ focus of attention and found 
support for the general idea that strategic decisions are made, and actions are taken, on 
the basis of where managers focus their attention.  Levy (2005) found that managerial 
attention devoted to the external, as opposed to the internal environment, was associated 
with a more expansive global strategic posture.  He argues that a global strategy requires 
management to look at potential opportunities that reside outside of the organization‘s 
local environment.  When managers focus more of its attention on outside opportunities it 
can take steps to exploit those opportunities through greater global expansion.  This 
results in a broader global market position.  Focus of attention is a necessary first step in 
this process, as is supported in many other studies of managerial attention. 
 For instance, Cho & Hambrick (2006) found that the greater the increase in 
managerial attention toward an entrepreneurial orientation, the greater the change in an 
organization‘s strategy towards a more entrepreneurial strategy.  Kaplan (2008) found 
evidence that when CEOs in the communications technology industry focused more 
heavily on new optics technology, greater changes in the organization‘s patenting activity 
in optics occurred.  These results persisted even when considering organizational 
characteristics such as incentives and firm capabilities.  Similarly, Nadkarni & Barr 
(2008) found that focusing on different aspects of the organization‘s external 
27 
 
environment, for example its task versus general environment, influenced the speed with 
which the organization responded to major changes in its external environment.  They 
argued that top managers will be more likely to respond and act quickly because they 
recognize, understand, and have responses ready to enact when changes are occurring in 
sectors that are central to their cognition. 
 Bouquet and colleagues (2009) examined top managers‘ international attention 
and whether that had an impact on performance of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
They found that international attention—the extent to which top managers invested their 
time and energy into activities and communications aimed at improving their 
understanding of the global marketplace, was significantly related to MNE performance.  
Finally, Egger & Kaplan (2009) found that CEO attention to emerging technologies was 
associated with an accelerated entry into a new product market, while attention focused 
on existing technologies was associated with slower movement into a new product 
market. 
 The findings of these studies validate the importance that managerial attention 
plays in organizations.  These studies provide evidence that where, and what, managers 
focus their attention on impacts the subsequent strategic decisions they make.   While 
these studies provide us with support for managerial focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997), no 
existing work examines the importance that managerial attention devoted to potential 
downside risks play in organizations.  I outline below the impact that managerial 
attention to risk, as well as organizational slack, may have for organizations and why it is 




Theoretical arguments and hypotheses 
Early organization theory work has suggested that slack resources can be 
important for helping organizations withstand the effect that downside risks can 
cause.  According to Thompson (1967) slack can serve as a buffer for 
organizations.  This buffer should insulate the organization‘s value-creating 
activities from changes in the organization‘s environment so that the organization 
can operate free from interruption.  Similarly, Cyert & March (1963) argued that 
slack resources act as an insurance policy against abrupt changes in the 
organization‘s environment.  When changes occur that can negatively impact the 
organization, slack is the cushion that organizations can lean on.  Similarly, 
Cheng & Kesner (1997) have argued that slack can serve as a shock absorber and 
assist organizations when facing environmental contingencies by giving managers 
more strategic options and flexibility.  
 I argue that slack is beneficial for organizations because it allows 
organizations to absorb the impact of surprises that can hurt the organization.  
When organizations have more slack they are able to weather contingencies and 
changes in their environment.  Slack resources soften the blow should an 
unexpected event occur—slack serves as a buffer, insulating the organization‘s 
vital operations from being impacted.  Alternatively, organizations with fewer 
slack resources have a much smaller cushion and, as a result, will experience 
much more harm should a change in the environment introduce downside risk to 
the organization.  These arguments coincide with Thompson‘s (1967) idea of 
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slack as a buffer of the organization‘s technical core.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis:      
Hypothesis 1:  There will be a negative relationship between an 
organization’s available slack resources and the likelihood that the 
organization experiences a risk event. 
In addition to slack resources, I also argue that managerial attention plays a role in how 
organizations are able to withstand downside risk.  Bettis (1983) has argued that 
organizational missteps may result from managerial inattention to important risks facing 
the organization.  Drawing from an attention-based perspective (Ocasio, 1997), strategic 
actions taken by organizations are largely a function of what managers have focused their 
limited attention upon (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Nadkarni & 
Barr, 2008).  In the context of this study, I argue that when managers are more focused on 
strategic issues that have been classified as risks, they are more likely than managers who 
focus less attention on risk to withstand the effect of downside risk.  I argue that when 
managers devote more attention to risk, they are more likely to develop responses and 
strategies to handle those risks.   
 This general idea is not only supported by an attention-based theory but is also 
consistent with research in the organizational threats literature (Dutton & Jackson, 1987).  
Threats have been defined along similar lines as risk and, in some instances, the terms 
threat and risk are used interchangeably (e.g. Andrews, 1980).  Jackson & Dutton (1988) 
have suggested that threats are stimuli from the organization‘s environment that have the 
potential to harm the organization, or are likely to result in a loss for the organization.  In 
this literature, it has been argued that when managers have categorized a strategic issue as 
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a threat, managers will formulate responses to ensure that the threat (threats) is (are) 
handled to avoid harm to the organization (Dutton & Jackson, 1987).   
 I argue that these responses can consist of risk management measures.  The 
success of risk management is built on the notion that managers are aware of, and have 
identified, the key sources of risk facing the organization (Chapman, 2011; Frame, 2003; 
Shenkir, Barton & Walker, 2010).  The risk management process allows managers to 
rigorously identify the key contingencies in the organization‘s external and internal 
environments, analyze and evaluate these risks to understand how they may be related to 
one another and how they might impact the organization, formulate strategies to respond 
to the risks, and incorporate those responses into the overarching organizational strategy.   
 As a result, these risk management measures help managers do several things.  
First, managers can make decisions about risk management more intelligently.  Risk 
management processes require managers to perform a thorough analysis which highlights 
the likely downside risks facing organizations.  This information can be used to 
preemptively handle downside risk through strategies aimed at avoiding specific risks 
altogether or transferring those risks to other parties (Frame, 2003).  Second, managers 
can formulate better strategies for when risks are inevitable.  When risk is unavoidable 
for organizations, managers can formulate strategies aimed at mitigating the impact that 
the risk has on the organization (Chapman, 2011).  Due to these benefits, organizations 
are less likely to be harmed when risk management strategies are in place. 
 This line of reasoning suggests that managerial attention to risk forms the basis 
for helping organizations avoid risk events through the use of risk management activities 
and planning.  More specifically, this suggests the following:    
31 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There will be a negative relationship between the amount 
of managerial attention allocated towards risk and the likelihood that the 
organization experiences a risk event.   
Organizations can be surprised as a result of a risk event from many sources.  Risk is a 
complex and multi-dimensional construct.  Research from a number of fields has 
contributed to illuminating the many sources of risk organizations face.  For example, 
management and finance researchers have recognized the importance of taking into 
account strategic risks (e.g. Collins & Ruefli, 1992; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), 
operational risk (e.g. Del Bel Belluz, 2010; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997), and financial 
risks (e.g. Miller, 1998; Rogers, 2010).  These risk categories represent just a few of the 
many categories advanced in the business literatures.  In this study, I examine a set of 
eight categories of risk (which are discussed in more detail in the Methods section).   
 Each category of risk presents a unique challenge for managers.  Furthermore, 
each type of risk requires different strategies for successful management of that risk.  For 
instance, financial risks may be more effectively handled through hedging strategies 
while operational risks may be more effectively handled by changes in existing 
operational practices and routines, such as quality control programs.  The right mix of 
strategies to respond to these various risks will depend upon the correlation of these risks 
and the organization‘s existing goals and objectives.   
 Keeping with an attention-based perspective, I argue that for organizations to be 
able to withstand the impact of downside risks, such as avoiding risk events, managers 
must allocate attention to a broad range of risks.  By casting a wide net, managers are 
ensuring that they are informed of all possible sources of downside risk that may impact 
32 
 
the organization and thus have better information for decision making.  By attending to a 
wider and more diverse group of risks, managers can limit potential surprises because 
they are less likely to have ―risk‖ blindspots—where blindspots result from management 
having an incomplete picture of their environments.  With greater diversity in 
information, managers can formulate strategies directed at handling multiple sources of 
potential contingencies.      
 Levy (2005) found that when managers of MNEs devoted attention to more 
diverse elements in its external environment, it led to more expansive global postures 
where managers were less likely to overlook and be taken by surprise by changes in its 
environment.  Similarly, I argue that when managers allocate attention to a greater array 
of downside risks, they are less likely to overlook any one source of risk when 
developing plans and strategies.  As a result, they should be less likely to be impacted by 
a downside risk.  This suggests the following: 
Hypothesis 3:  There will be a negative relationship between the variety of 
risks managers allocate attention towards and the likelihood that the 
organization experiences a risk event. 
While I posit that paying more attention to a greater array of potential risks helps 
organizations avoid risk events in general, it also may logically follow that when 
organizations focus on specific types of risks they should also be able to avoid 
risk events associated with those risks.  I argue that when managers channel their 
attention resources on fewer sources of risk, for instance they are focusing more 
attention on operational contingencies as opposed to financial or legal 
contingencies, they are more likely to develop more detailed and comprehensive 
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strategies and responses that are aimed at these specific sources of risk.  As a 
result, the organization should experience fewer risk events related to these areas 
where it has devoted a greater degree of attention.  This suggests the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4:  There will be a negative relationship between the amount 
of attention managers devote to a specific downside risk (e.g. general, 
competitive, operational, legal, etc.) and the likelihood that the 
organization experiences a risk event due to that specific type of risk. 








To test the hypotheses, I started by collecting an initial sample of all the companies that 
appeared in the S&P 500 index anytime in 2006.  This includes companies that entered 
into the index anytime during the year or left the index at any point during the year.  This 
yielded an initial sample of 532 companies.  Of those 532 companies, I was able to 
obtaining matching unique identifiers across the different data sources used for this study 
on 529 companies.  From those 529 companies, I excluded all of the financial and 
insurance companies as well as investment holding companies and trusts (such as 
REITs).  I excluded these companies since they have different reporting requirements and 
are held to a different standard of disclosure than non-financial companies.  They are also 
subject to different rules, regulations and laws than companies in other industries.  I 
located these companies by examining two digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 
codes and eliminating companies that had SIC codes between 60 and 69.  A total of 98 
companies fit into one of these categories.  As a result, the initial sample of companies 
was reduced from 529 to 431 companies.  For these 431 companies I collect data from
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2007 until 2012.   
 Once all data has been collected I also exclude companies whose stock price was 
below $10 (more information for why this is done can be found in my discussion of the 
dependent variables used for this study) and any company that did not have any available 
data for at least one of the hypothesized independent variables.  This final step results in a 
sample size of 417 unique companies.  Unfortunately, not every company remains a part 
of the sample over this time span due to things like privatization and bankruptcy, thus my 
panel dataset is an unbalance panel whereby there are an unequal number of time periods 
in which each company appears in the sample.  Also, since my dependent variable occurs 
on a daily basis I test my hypotheses using a monthly datapoint system whereby I assign 
the value of the yearly data to each monthly observation for the following fiscal year.  
Thus I am able to capture 'risk events' that would otherwise be lost by condensing the 
data into a yearly format.  Additionally, constructing the data in the monthly format also 
results in a much more fine-grained control for time related effects.  The final number of 
observations is 27,874.  However, due to the issues mentioned above as well as the way 




In this study, the dependent variable is 'risk event.'  To operationalize this variable, I look 
for evidence that companies have experienced a large, negative, unexpected and discrete 
event.  In doing this, I look for abrupt declines in a company's stock price as providing 
evidence that something unexpected happens (Akhigbe, Larson & Madura, 2002; Yu & 
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Leistikow, 2011).  Stock prices are supposed to encompass all available information and 
thus changes in stock price only occur when new information becomes available that may 
alter what is currently known about the future cash flows (or growth prospects) of the 
company.  Large abrupt changes suggest that new information not previously taken into 
account has come into existence which causes an immediate revaluation of the equity 
security (Fama, 1970). 
 Stock price information was gathered using the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP) database.  To operationalize this variable, several steps were taken.  First, 
stock prices are collected for every trading day during the year for every company in my 
sample.  Second, I look at the return of the stock (without dividends) over the course of 
one trading day (from the close on day 'd-1' to the close on day 'd').  To classify a change 
in stock prices as an 'event' I draw on work in the field of finance which examines stock 
price events.  These studies commonly use a minimum decline of 10% as the cutoff point 
for determining whether a stock has experienced an event or not (Bremer & Sweeney, 
1991; Cox & Peterson, 1994).  Therefore, I look for declines of 10% or more from the 
close on day 'd-1' to the close on day 'd' to find 'risk events.'   
 I take several additional steps to try and ensure that the 'risk events' found are true 
events and not trading anomalies.  More specifically, I apply the following set of criteria.  
First, as suggested above, the stock must decline 10% from consecutive day closing 
prices.  Second, I correct for the return of the stock market.  Stocks must decline 10% in 
excess of the average return for its peers -- companies in the S&P 500.  I make this 
correction because for days when the market trades lower as a whole, declines may be 
skewed by overall negative market sentiment.  Thus, declines are only classified as an 
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event if on days when the S&P 500 declines, the stock declines in excess of 10% of the 
market return.  Third, I want to make sure that the decline is due to an event and not 
profit taking due to a run up in the price of the stock.  I look at percentage returns over 
the course of the seven days and three days preceding the decline as well as the day 
preceding the decline.  In order to be classified as an event, the stock could not have run 
up by more than 50% over the previous seven, three, or one day time periods before the 
event takes place.  Fourth, I also ensure that there are no large retracements in the price of 
the stock.  A large retracement of the entire move may suggest an overreaction or 
misinterpretation of the information by the market or a market rumor about the company.  
Thus, I make sure that the price of the stock on the next day, as well as the third and 
seventh day after the event, is not trading higher than its pre-event closing level.  Fifth, 
low volume in the stock can exacerbate price movements and declines.  Thus, only 
declines that occur on days where the volume traded of the stock is greater than 10,000 
shares are used.  I believe that these criteria help me to narrow down the field of events to 
those most likely to be a result of a shock, or risk event, to the organization. 
 Finally, there is some evidence to suggest that as the price of the stock becomes 
cheaper, stock events become more frequent because it takes less capital to drive down 
the price of the stock and because smaller price changes result in larger changes in 
percentage terms.  Thus, I use a common cutoff by research in the field of finance which 
examines stock price events (e.g. Yu & Leistikow, 2011). The research on stock events 
tend to discount events where the stock price is under $10 and only examine the events 
where the stock has traded above $10 on the day preceding the event.  For my analysis I 
apply this metric and classify an event as occurring only if the close of the stock price on 
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the day preceding the event is greater than $10.  Companies who are not eligible to 
experience an event due to stock price have also been excluded from the analysis.  I also 
use this cutoff for a more practical reason.  Initially I looked at events that occurred 
regardless of stock price.  A preliminary analysis of these instances revealed that 
companies whose stock traded below $10 had very poor media coverage thus making it 
very difficult to gather any meaningful data on reasons for an event.  Further, declines on 
the very low priced stocks were increasingly not due to any company specific news. 
 Any stock that met the aforementioned criteria was given a '1' as having 
experienced an event, otherwise the company received a '0' signaling no event.  This 
dependent variable was used to test hypotheses one, two and three. In my final sample 
there were 499 events that satisfied the criteria.  
 For hypothesis four, I create a second dependent variable that categorizes each 
event according to a specific type of risk.  While there are numerous risks that companies 
encounter (Chapman, 2011), I am interested in a parsimonious set of risks that have been 
recognized across disciplines, and prior studies, as important sources of risks for 
organizations.  I have created a list of eight risks that appear across the finance, risk 
management and strategic management literature on risk--general environment related 
risks, competitive environment related risks, operational risks, legal risks, strategic risks, 
financial (internal vs. external) risks, and other risks (for instance weather events like 
hurricanes).  The list of categories used for this study, distinctions between categories and 
examples of each can be found in Appendix 1.               
 I categorize each event as residing in one of these eight categories.  To do this I 
search for each event by the company name (or ticker) the two days before and after the 
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event.  I used both LexisNexis and Factiva to find news articles related to the event to 
uncover a specific cause(s).  For items where LexisNexis or Factiva contained no 
information, I ran a Google search to try and find a cause.  This approach is similar to the 
textual approach offered by Gephart (1993) in that variables for the analysis are collected 
from various text documents which include newspaper stories, company documents 
released to investors, and transcripts of conference calls and television reports to 
construct the reasoning behind a specific event.  Collecting texts from multiple sources 
gives researchers the opportunity to learn about the event from the different perspectives 
of the parties observing the event.  For this study, I looked for common themes that 
emerged from the different data sources.  When multiple sources could corroborate the 
reason for the 'risk event' the reason was recorded and coded. 
Independent Variables 
Slack.  In this study I am interested in slack resources that are readily available and 
deployable.  Thus, I collect data on available, otherwise known as financial, slack.  Prior 
research has operationalized this type of slack as the current ratio (e.g. Bromiley, 1991; 
Cheng & Kesler, 1997).  The current ratio consists of current assets divided by the 
current liabilities.  I collect this information from the COMPUSTAT database. 
Managerial attention to risk.  Researchers examining a number of theoretical domains in 
strategy have alluded to the ―black box‖ problem in organizational research (e.g. Baum & 
Ingram, 1998; Hambrick, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992; Priem & Butler, 2001).  This problem 
arises due to the difficulty of observing some of the intricacies of organizational behavior 
occurring inside the confines of the organization.  Because of constraints on resources 
(such as financial and time), it is difficult for researchers to collect large and diverse 
40 
 
samples by going into numerous organizations and observing internal processes.  Making 
matters worse, especially in the case of large organizations, executives responsible for 
formulating and implementing strategy tend to not respond in large numbers to requests 
for interviews or to fill out questionnaires (largely because of their responsibilities and 
resource constraints).   
 Measuring constructs like managerial attention presents further difficulty since 
these things are embedded within the minds of individual managers (Huff, 1990; Lant & 
Shapira, 2001).  As a result of these issues, researchers attempt to use unobtrusive 
methods to develop measures which represent reasonable proxies for organizational and 
managerial cognition and behavior.  For instance, researchers utilizing an attention-based 
framework look for places that managers share their views with external constituents and 
argue that these sources of data are a representation of managerial cognition and attention 
(e.g. Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  Collecting and analyzing data of this nature can be done 
through content analysis. 
 Content analysis is a research methodology which is particularly useful in strategy 
research because of its unobtrusive nature (Krippendorf, 1980; Morris, 1994; Weber, 
1990).  The idea behind content analysis is that an individual‘s cognition and thoughts 
about the world can be deduced from the words that individuals use (Sapir,1944; Whorf 
1956).  Thus, analyzing written content which is forged by those in charge can help 
organizational researchers open up the ‗black box‘ by gaining some insight into the 
cognitions of the organization‘s decision makers.  Content analysis involves examining 
pieces of text, usually from company documents such as company filings (such as 10-Ks, 
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10-Qs, Proxy statements, etc.), annual reports (e.g. letters to shareholders), or official 
company statements, and pulling out information that relates to the research question.   
 Content analysis has been used in numerous studies in strategic management and, 
more specifically, in research examining managerial cognition.  For instance, Cho & 
Hambrick (2006) and Nadkarni & Barr (2008) both used content analysis on letters to 
shareholders to examine managerial attention, while Mishina and colleagues (2004) used 
written narratives from private databases.  Further, and more relevant to my study, 
several studies have used company 10-K filings as sources for managerial attention (e.g. 
Angriawan & Abebe, 2011; Maula, Keil & Zahra, 2012; Mishina et al., 2004).  In 
addition to the face validity of content analysis, prior academic studies have worked to 
empirically confirm and validate that company documents can be used as proxies for 
managerial cognition (e.g. D'Aveni & MacMillian, 1990; Huff & Schwenk, 1990).  
 To construct my measures of managerial attention to risk, I examine the 10Ks of 
all the companies in my sample.  By law, organizations are required to disclose 
information related to specific risks that may impact their organization in their year-end 
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  More specifically, the SEC 
has instructed companies to disclose risks specific to their company which may result in 
material losses for their shareholders, in section 1A of their annual 10K filing under the 
heading of 'Risk Factors.'
2
   Several complete examples from sample companies can be 
found in Appendix 2.   
                                                          
2
 Starting in 2005 the SEC has required that companies must provide a discussion of risk factors in ―plain 
English‖ to investors, consistent with the Securities Act of 1933 and established by Rule 503(c).  Rule 
503(c) reads as follows (taken directly from the SEC website):  Where appropriate, provide under the 
caption ―Risk Factors‖ a discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or 
risky. This discussion must be concise and organized logically. Do not present risks that could apply to any 
issuer or any offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being offered. Set forth each 
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 Research in both accounting and finance have validated the importance of the 
mandatory disclosure of key risks as providing important information by the 
organization‘s management to its stakeholders (Campbell, et al., 2012; Huang, 2011; 
Kravert & Muslu, 2011).  While some financial analysts have suggested that perhaps the 
mandatory disclosures are nothing more than boilerplates used by the organization to 
cover their bases for legal reasons, research has shown that this is not the case and that 
they do provide important information about key threats (Campbell, et al., 2012).  Figure 
2 has a graphical representation of changes in company word count reporting during the 
sampling time frame to illustrate the differences between firms.  Three firms from two 
different industries are plotted and the contrasts within industry and across industry in 
terms of number of words and trends in word counts are noticeable upon a visual 
inspection of the information. 
 Hypothesis two utilizes the independent variable managerial attention to risk.  To 
gauge the amount of managerial attention devoted to risk, I examine section 1A of the 
10K filings for my sample companies and calculate the total number of words that appear 
in that section.  Since managers are given great discretion over what they determine is 
appropriate or relevant to include in section 1A, larger counts should correspond to 
greater levels of attention to risk.  The word counts are generated by using the Direct 
                                                                                                                                                                             
risk factor under a subcaption that adequately describes the risk. The risk factor discussion must 
immediately follow the summary section. If you do not include a summary section, the risk factor section 
must immediately follow the cover page of the prospectus or the pricing information section that 
immediately follows the cover page. Pricing information means price and price-related information that 
you may omit from the prospectus in an effective registration statement based on §230.430A(a) of this 
chapter. The risk factors may include, among other things, the following: (1) Your lack of an operating 
history; (2) Your lack of profitable operations in recent periods; (3) Your financial position; (4) Your 
business or proposed business; or (5) The lack of a market for your common equity securities or securities 





Edgar Section Extraction Tool found on the Direct Edgar website.  This is a relatively 
new tool developed by Direct Edgar and this study is one of the first to use output from 
this tool.  
Diversity of managerial attention to risk. To test hypothesis three, I formulate a variable 
which measures the diversity of risks that managers devote their attention.  For this 
variable, I utilized a proprietary software coding which pulled out the subheadings (each 
risk listed by the company) in section 1A of the 10K.  I then classify each of these 
subheadings within the section using the same categorization which was developed to 
classify a 'risk event' as stated in the section discussing my dependent variables above.  
Attention diversity was constructed in two steps.  First, I generated a list of key words 
associated with each of the risk categories (please see Appendix 3 for the list of key 
words).  Second, for any subheading that was not categorized by key word, I read through 
and coded each by hand according to the descriptions given in Appendix 1.   
 Once this is done I create a ratio of the total number of risk categories which are 
mentioned in section 1A for that company versus the total number of risk categories 
(eight possible categories).  
Depth of managerial attention to specific risks.  Finally, to test hypothesis four, I 
formulate a variable which measures the amount of attention to which top managers 
focus on one specific risk.  Similar to Cho & Hambrick (2006) in their study of attention, 
I calculated a series of variables which represented each risk category.  For each risk 
listed in section 1A I generated a count variable which was equal to the number of 
headings that were used to describe risks that belonged to the same category.  The more 
headings for a specific risk category, the greater the attention devoted to that risk.   
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Control variables.   
In addition to my constructs of interest, I also include several control variables.  Larger 
firms, as well as those that perform better, have the resources to increase their attentional 
capacity and have more resources at their disposal to dedicate towards mitigation 
strategies.  This could result in a greater level of attention to risk as well as fewer 'risk 
events.'  Thus, I control for this possibility by including the organization‘s total dollar 
amount of assets as a proxy for firm size.  To control for company performance I use 
return on assets (RoA).  I also control for the equity price risk of the stock.  To construct 
a measure of equity price risk, I calculate the standard deviation of the return on the stock 
for the prior month.  This measure is preferred to Beta since Beta is dependent on the 
market portfolio it is being compared.  All control variables were calculated using data 
from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases and were calculated for time 't-1.'   
Preliminary Data Check 
Missing data analysis 
Before beginning the analysis, a preliminary check of the data was done to determine the 
extent of missing data as well as the presence of outliers, or leverage points.  Missing 
data can be problematic for two reasons:  first, from a practical perspective it can reduce 
the sample size and hurt power; second, it could lead to biased results if the missing data 
process results in systematic missing data (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010).  Thus, 
it is important to understand the degree of missing data to determine if it can be ignored 
(when it is deemed to be missing completely at random) or if some remedy needs to be 
applied (missing not at random).   
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 First, I looked at a general summary of the missing data by examining frequencies 
and percentage of missing data for each variable.  Generally, most variables had less than 
15% missing data, however, several variables associated with the attention diversity and 
attention depth measures had close to a third missing data.  Next, I looked at any patterns 
of missing data.  Aside from the missing data associated with the diversity and depth 
measures, the patterns appeared to be random in nature when examined visually.  I then 
proceeded to empirically diagnose the missing data.  I broke all of my variables of 
interest into groups (missing versus non-missing).  I then performed multiple t-tests of the 
means between those two groups on key variables like firm size, firm performance, 
capital expenditures, and total revenue.  While select t-tests did indicate that the means on 
several of these variables were equivalent, the majority suggested that they were not.  
Finally, I also performed Little's MCAR test (Little, 1988) and it was non-significant 
indicating the data are not missing completely at random.   
 After these analyses, while the missing data do not appear to be missing 
completely at random, the majority of the missing data are relatively small in number 
(less than 15% in most instances) and thus will not materially impact power for my 
statistical tests given the large number of cases with non-missing values.  Further, there is 
no reason to suspect that the pattern of missing data is due to a systematic error which is 
consistent across missing data points.  The areas where there are larger amounts of 
missing data are due to random, unique formatting decisions in the reporting of the 10-K 
filings by individual companies.  Thus, the decision was made to use pairwise deletion 





In addition to missing data, I also looked for outliers, or leverage points, in my data.  
Outliers are observations which are markedly different from the other observations in the 
sample.  According to Hair et al. (2010: 65), "Outliers cannot be categorically 
characterized as either beneficial or problematic, but instead must be viewed within the 
context of the analysis and should be evaluated by the types of information they may 
provide."  Typically outliers occur due to a procedural, or data entry, error; an 
extraordinary event with a well known cause; an extraordinary event with no explanation; 
or have a unique combination of values across different variables in the analysis.  They 
are problematic to the extent that if they are not representative of the population, they can 
skew the results of the analysis. 
 To explore my data for outliers I used a three step process for detecting any 
potential outliers as suggested by Hair et al., (2010).  First, I performed a univariate 
detection analysis.  I generated the standard deviation of each variable considered for the 
analysis and calculated plus and minus four standard deviations from the mean.  Any 
value that was greater than four standard deviations from the mean was flagged for 
further analysis.  Second, I performed a bivariate detection analysis.  Since the number of 
variables is large (greater than 10), Hair et al. (2010) suggest looking at only the bivariate 
relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables.  I generated box 
plots to examine these relationships.  Last, I performed a multivariate detection analysis.  
I performed a logit regression with my variables of interest and then predicted and plotted 
the residuals and delta betas (dbetas).  From this analysis I also flagged any extreme 
values and then compared those values to the potential outliers flagged in the univariate 
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and bivariate analysis.  There were four specific observations that looked particularly 
problematic so I examined each case manually.  The underlying cause of the deviations 
stemmed from the variable used to proxy 'equity price risk.'  Upon review, there was no 
error in the data entry and none of these observations were extreme on a sufficient 
number of key variables to be considered a poor representation of the population, I 
retained all variables for the analysis.  
Analysis 
My hypothesized models test four direct relationships, but imply that the independent 
variables precede the dependent variable in time.  As such, I collect my dependent 
variable at time 't' and all independent and control variables at time 't-1.'  The dependent 
variable used for analysis is a dichotomous variable.  Dichotomous dependent variables 
violate several assumptions needed to obtain unbiased and efficient estimates for 
hypothesis testing using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Maddala, 1983; 
Wiersema & Bowen, 2009).  More specifically, dichotomous dependent variables result 
in error terms that follow a binomial distribution as opposed to a normal distribution; the 
variance of dichotomous variables are not equal across observations, thus creating 
heteroskedasticity; and dichotomous dependent variables violate normality and linearity 
assumptions (Hair, et al., 2010).  As a result, a technique designed to overcome these 
limitations is necessary.  The most common method employed for examining binary 
dependent variables is logistic regression analysis.  Logistic regression does not face the 
strict assumptions needed for OLS regression--mainly normality, homoskedasticity, and 
linearity of the error term.   
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 The nature of the data by which some firms experience events in certain time 
periods while many do not lends itself to a case-control type of research design.  When 
the dependent variable is binary, this type of design can be analyzed using conditional 
logistic regression (McFadden, 1974), also known as a fixed effects logistic regression 
model.  Conditional logistic regression is similar in nature to ordinary logistic regression 
with the exception that the data are grouped.  The idea is to fit a logistic model which 
explains why any given company has a positive outcome (a "1", or experiences a risk 
event) conditional on the other outcomes in the group.  Conditional logit analysis is 
common for estimating models with zero/one dependent variables such as that in this 
study (Bowen & Wiersema, 2004; Harris & Bromiley, 2007).  For this analysis, I grouped 
companies by month and industry to control for external variables that influence the 
underlying probability of a risk event for firms in an industry at a particular time.  
Essentially, this specification is equivalent to the inclusion of dummy variables for each 
combination of month and industry to control for unobserved drivers of risk.  Of all the 
firms in a particular industry at a particular time, the model estimates the effect of firm 
attributes on the probability that a firm will experience a risk event.  The equation used 
for this analysis is given by equation 1.   
Equation 1: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑗  =  1)  =  𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝛽′ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑚 ) / 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝛽′ 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑚 )
𝑗  ≠ 𝑘
 
The numerator of this expression is a function of the attributes of company j in industry i 
in month m, and the denominator is a function of the attributes of all companies that 
could potentially experience an event in industry i in month m.  Variables related to 
industry and time period that might affect the likelihood of a company experiencing an 
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event appear both in the numerator and denominator and so cancel each other out leaving 
the firm specific variables of interest. 
 If a coefficient is positive and significant, this indicates that an increase in the 
value of the variable of interest increases the likelihood that a company experiences a risk 
event.  If a coefficient is negative and significant, this indicates that an increase in the 
value of the variable of interest decreases the likelihood that a company experiences a 
risk event.  The disadvantage to using the conditional logistic regression approach is that 
it typically results in a smaller sample size.  A smaller sample size can occur because 
when there is no variance in the dependent variable for some group (i.e. if no companies 
in a particular industry experience a risk event in a particular month), then all those 
observations drop out of the analysis since they provide no useful information for 
estimating what effects the probability of an event. 
 I estimated all models using robust standard errors.  Finally, I checked the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for extreme collinearity between covariates.  The 
individual VIFs ranged from 1.08 to 1.86, with an average VIF of 1.25.  Since all the 
VIFs are well below the commonly accepted cut-off level of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West & 







The means, standard deviations and pairwise correlations of the variables used in this 
study are reported in Table 2.  Correlations significant at the .05 level are designated as 
such by a star in the matrix.  The results of the conditional logit regression analyses 
appear in Tables 3 and 4.  Model 1 in Table 3 contains only the control variables and the 
likelihood that a company experienced an event conditioned on the time variable and 
membership in its industry.  The second model adds available slack to the control model.  
The third model adds managerial attention to risk to the model while the fourth model 
adds attention diversity to the model.  To test hypothesis four which posited that 
managerial attention depth was negatively associated with the likelihood of experiencing 
a risk event, multiple models were run -- one for each category of risk.  Table 4 contains 
each of the models testing attention depth. 
 Across the models, several control variables have significant effects on the 
likelihood that a company experienced an event.  Firm size, as measured by assets, 
exhibits a consistent negative relationship with the likelihood that a company experiences 
an event.  Additionally, firm performance is negatively associated with the likelihood that 
51 
 
a company experiences an event, although this relationship is significant when 
considering only the controls and when adding available slack.  Thus it appears that 
larger companies are less likely to experience an event, as are companies that are better 
performers.   
 Hypothesis one suggested a negative relationship between a company‘s available 
slack resources and the likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  Model 2 in Table 3 
shows the results for the test of hypothesis one.  According to the analysis, the coefficient 
on available slack is negative but not significant.  Thus, hypothesis one is not supported.  
Hypothesis two suggested a negative relationship between managerial attention to risk 
and the likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  Model 3 in Table 3 shows the results for 
the test of hypothesis two.  The coefficient on managerial attention to risk is positive and 
significant (β = .00006; p < .001).  Thus, hypothesis two is not supported.  Hypothesis 
three suggested a negative relationship between managerial attention diversity and the 
likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  Model 4 in Table 3 shows the results for the test 
of hypothesis three.  The coefficient on managerial attention diversity is negative and 
significant (β = -.96524; p < .10), providing some support for hypothesis three.     
 Hypothesis four was tested using eight separate models – one for each category of 
risk.  Hypothesis four suggested a negative relationship between managerial attention 
depth and the likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  Table 4 has the results for each 
category of risk.  The coefficients on managerial attention depth for the general, 
competitive, financial-external, and other risk categories are negative as hypothesized but 
not significant.  The coefficients for the operational, strategic, financial-internal and legal 
risk categories are positive.  The coefficients for the operational (β = .08820; p < .05) and 
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strategic (β = .25716; p < .01) risk categories were significant.  Overall, the results 
provide no statistically significant support for hypothesis four. 
 Aside from the individual tests of hypothesis four, I undertook an additional 
analysis which sought to test a more parsimonious model of managerial attention depth.  
For this analysis, I condensed the eight risk categories into two categories – internal and 
external risks.  External risk consisted of risks outside the boundary of the company.  The 
risk categories of general, competitive, financial -- external, and other fit this designation, 
thus these risks and risk events were grouped together.  Internal risk consisted of risks 
that are within the boundary of the company.  The risk categories of operational, 
strategic, financial – internal, and legal fit this designation, thus these risks and risk 
events were grouped together.  Table 5 has the results of these analyses.  The coefficient 
for managerial attention depth as it relates to external risks was in the hypothesized 
direction and significant (β = -.04418; p < .10), thus providing some support for 
hypothesis four.  However, the coefficient for managerial attention depth as it relates to 
internal risks was positive and significant (β = .07266; p < .001), opposite of what was 
predicted in hypothesis four.  Overall, the results were mixed in their support for 
hypothesis four. 
 In sum, hypothesis one and two were not supported by the statistical analysis.  
Hypothesis three was supported (at the .10 level of analysis) while hypothesis four 







DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, the goal was to answer one central question:  Does having slack and 
managerial attention devoted to risk, both necessary for successful risk management, help 
reduce the likelihood that organizations experience risk events?  This was done by 
exploring several assertions made about slack and managerial attention that argued these 
organizational and managerial resources, when possessed, may confer a greater proclivity 
towards managing risk and avoiding 'risk events.'  As suggested earlier in this 
dissertation, risk events are particularly troublesome for organizations, often times 
draining them of important financial resources that would otherwise serve as the 
foundation for creating future value (Stulz, 1996).  The underlying premise was that 
when organizations had an increasing amount of slack resources or when managers' 
attention was more focused on potential risks facing the organization, that these things 
would result in a decreased probability of experiencing a 'risk event'--hence, having a risk 
management type of effect.   
 In the case of slack, this would be due to its ability to shield the technical core of 
the organization and absorb any negative effects of the event before it could hurt the key 
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value creating resources of the organization (Thompson 1967).  With respect to 
managerial attention, the underlying idea (and consistent with Ocasio's (1997) attention-
based perspective) was that managers who dedicate more of their attention to risk should 
be more likely to recognize potential disasters in their environment and take action to 
ensure they can navigate around and avoid these things.  In a way, managerial attention 
served as a proxy for who might be more likely to manage risk in general.  Further, it was 
suggested that by paying attention to a broader array of potential risk sources that 
organizations would be more likely to formulate more comprehensive plans and avoid 
risk 'blindspots.'  Finally, it was also suggested that when managers focus on a specific 
risk and give it more attention, they can help their company avoid being impacted by that 
one specific kind of risk. 
 Based on data from over 400 S&P 500 companies across multiple time periods, 
this dissertation provides evidence that possessing these resources had little to no effect 
on reducing the likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  However, several interesting 
findings did emerge from the analysis, which I will address here.  More specifically, I 
find that (1) greater attention diversity does reduce the likelihood of experiencing a risk 
event; (2) that attention to internal versus external risks impacts the likelihood of an 
internal and external event; and (3) more "attention" to risk results in a greater, not 
reduced, likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  
 The first finding that emerged was consistent with hypothesis three – greater 
managerial attention diversity, as it relates to risk, appears to have reduced the likelihood 
that a company experiences an event.  This finding was significant at the .10 level of 
analysis.  This finding suggests that when it comes to identifying the potential risks 
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facing the company, managers should be casting a very wide net which spans multiple 
functional areas as well as both the internal and external environment.  When managers 
have a more complete picture of the many different risks their companies face, they are 
impacted by fewer negative surprises.  This is consistent with Levy (2005) in that more 
diversity in attention leads managers to not overlook and be taken by surprise by changes 
in their environment.   
 While this result should be interpreted with caution, this finding supports the idea 
that risk management programs should be holistic in that managers from all across the 
company should be involved with the risk management process – especially when it 
comes to identifying potential sources of risk.  Having a select group of managers in 
charge of identifying and evaluating risks may leave the organization open to risks that 
managers from various functional areas within the company can readily identify.  This 
lends some support to the enterprise risk management (ERM) arguments (Fraser & 
Simkins, 2010) that the risk management process needs to evolve into an organization-
wide phenomenon. 
 With respect to attention depth, while the individual tests of the original eight 
categories yielded no statistical support for the original hypothesis, the supplemental 
analysis did yield statistically significant findings.  According to the analysis, attention 
depth as it relates to the internal and external environment had an impact on the 
likelihood of experiencing an internal or external event.   
 When managers‘ attention to internal risks was greater, their company had a 
higher likelihood of experiencing an internal event.  Whereas when managers‘ attention 
to external risks was greater, their company had a lower likelihood of experiencing an 
56 
 
external event.  Nadkarni & Barr (2008) found something similar with respect to the 
external environment in that where managers devoted their attention had an impact on the 
strategic actions they took.  This suggests that when managers are dealing with their 
external environments, attention was associated with reduced risk.  This is consistent with 
the argument that greater levels of attention, at least directed at the external environment, 
may result in greater risk management activities and a reduced likelihood of experiencing 
an event due to that type of risk.  However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for the 
internal environment.   
 Perhaps this has something to do with managers' locus of control.  It could be that 
while managers recognize internal risks, they feel that they have a higher level of control 
of these risks and thus do not act quickly, or at all, in response to these things.  However, 
when it comes to the external environment where they may feel that they have much less 
control, they are more diligent and respond by enacting risk management, or contingency 
planning.  Regardless of the underlying reasoning, these results add to what we know 
currently about attention devoted to the external environment and company action, and 
should be explored in more detail both theoretically and empirically. 
 Finally, my analysis uncovered an unexpected but interesting relationship.  It was 
hypothesized that managerial attention to risk would be negatively associated with 
experiencing a risk event.  However, the results suggested a positive and significant 
relationship.  Thus, when managers were displaying more attention to risk they were 
actually more likely to subsequently experience an event.  This result seems to contradict 
traditional tenets of the attention based view (Ocasio, 1997) – mainly, greater attention 
given to an object results in a greater likelihood of action aimed at that object (e.g. Cho & 
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Hambrick, 2006; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  In this case, greater attention given to risk 
should result in management taking actions aimed at those risks which hopefully results 
in a reduced likelihood of experiencing a risk event.  
 Instead, the results suggest that perhaps managers use the risk factor sections in 
the 10-K to signal and communicate to outsiders the riskiness of the company.  Indeed, 
greater risk disclosure (in terms of simple word counts) was associated with a greater 
likelihood of experiencing an event.  This does not necessarily mean that managers do 
not take actions aimed at reducing or eliminating risks that they recognize and disclose.  
However, companies are entities with limited amounts of resources and thus resource 
constraints make it unrealistic for managers to be able to reduce or eliminate every risk.   
 It is also worth noting that it does not appear that the companies where 
management attention to risk is high have fewer resources with which to enact some kind 
of action to guard against risk events.  Looking at the pairwise correlation, slack and 
managerial attention to risk are positively and significantly correlated which suggests that 
companies with more available resources are also giving more attention to risk. 
 Taken together, the findings uncovered here contribute to our understanding of 
managerial attention, risk and risk management.  However, these findings should be 
considered in light of the limitations of the current study.     
Limitations 
As with any study there are several limitations that may hinder the external validity of 
these findings.  First, my sample is drawn from the population of companies in the S&P 
500 index.  The S&P 500 index constitutes the largest, public companies in the United 
States.  Thus, the findings here may be well suited and tailored to larger companies as 
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opposed to smaller companies.  Further, one of the criteria used for inclusion into the 
sample was having a stock price that was greater than $10 – typically associated with 
firm size as well, thus further restricting the sample to larger companies.   
 Second, all of the companies in the sample are publicly traded companies.  No 
privately held companies were used as part of the analysis.  There are important 
differences between publicly traded companies and privately held companies.  One such 
difference is in the regulatory and media scrutiny that publicly traded companies, whose 
stock trades on an exchange, receive that privately held companies do not.  This 
additional scrutiny may play a role in the level of risk management activities companies 
undertake.  Another such difference is the reporting requirements between publicly traded 
and privately held companies.  Thus, availability of information was also a consideration 
when collecting data for this study.  As a result, the findings are based upon only publicly 
traded companies and their application to privately held companies is cautioned. 
 Third, this sample is specific to publicly traded companies in the United States.  
Different countries have different institutional environments.  Hence attitudes on risk and 
risk management are likely to be diverse across countries and cultures.  Also, reporting 
requirements are going to be different between countries, which make collecting data on 
risk and risk management activities exceedingly difficult.  Thus, the results are limited in 
their validity beyond samples based on U.S. based companies.   
 Fourth, there was a limitation as a result of the data gathering process.  As 
mentioned in the analysis above, there were some systematic missing data as a result of 
the written computer program to gather some of the data used in the analysis.  
Unfortunately with this particular source of data, there has been no proven, or simple, 
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way to collect the data.  Since there is no universally required reporting format (aside 
from listing risks under the heading of risk factors), companies are at liberty to decide 
how to display that information.  This creates problems for any program designed to 
locate the risk factor subheadings and pull that information out for analysis.  While I 
believe that the computer code written and used was able to obtain a great deal of 
information not previously available for analysis, the reader should be mindful that this is 
the first step of a lengthy process that hopefully other scholars will help to advance.  I 
would be remiss however, not to mention that the results concerning this data (especially 
for hypothesis three and four) should be interpreted with caution. 
 A further complication comes from the limitation in the reporting by the 
companies themselves.  There seems to be at least a small amount of confusion across 
companies and management teams by what is meant by the word risk in general.  There is 
a substantive difference between identifying sources of potential risk, risk events 
themselves, and outcomes of risk events.  This makes the process of deciphering what is 
contained in these risk factor sections much more difficult.  Unfortunately, aside from the 
SEC clearly delineating between these three things and diligently enforcing these 
definitions, this will remain a problem for this line of research.  
Future Research 
Several future research directions could be taken as a result of the limitations surrounding 
the sample and data gathering process in this study alone.  For instance, the sample in this 
study was limited to large, public and domestic companies.  Future research might 
consider exploring whether or not these results generalize to a population of companies 
that are smaller, private or international.  The attention related data used in this study 
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would be attainable for smaller companies that are public but other proxy variables would 
need to be formulated to gauge attention to risk by managers of private companies or 
international companies.  This would be especially true for international companies 
where reporting requirements are likely much different as it relates to risk disclosure.  
Further, future research might also explore how cultural differences in attitudes toward 
risk and risk management impact managerial cognition and firm behavior as it pertains to 
managing potential risks. 
 A second potential research direction involves the dependent variable used in this 
study and the overall framing of this paper as it pertains to risk management.  As 
suggested in the introduction to this paper, risk management is a difficult phenomenon to 
study because there is a general lack of good proxy variables for managing risk.  While 
"attention to risk" was used here as a proxy for companies that might be more likely to be 
doing something about potential risks, there are really no existing variables to accurately 
gauge the level of risk management happening within the organization.  Furthermore, the 
outcome variables used to assess the effectiveness of risk management are similarly 
lacking.  While studies in finance use variables like improved performance and standard 
deviation of returns over time, these measures are failing to capture one of the chief 
benefits of risk management -- avoiding what I have termed 'risk events.'  Future research 
should focus on better ways to measure both risk management and risk management 
benefits.  Standard and Poor's has started to do some work on the former by incorporating 
ratings on risk management into its overall security rating for companies, but much more 
work exists for scholars studying the importance of a risk management program.  
61 
 
Qualitative work may be most appropriate to understand the degree to which firms are 
managing risk as well as how they go about identifying and evaluating such risks. 
 A third potential area of research concerns the data itself.  Section 1A of the 10-K 
is relatively new and there has been minimal work on quantifying its potential for 
research studies.  Prior studies have suggested that it contains useful pieces of 
information (e.g. Cambell et al., 2012; Kravert &  Muslu, 2011), however these studies 
have only scratched the surface of potential data.  Future research could delve much 
deeper into the subheadings contained within the section.  For instance, research could 
explore to what extent the subheadings are meaningful.  Are the subheadings generic or 
specific, do they have a positive or negative tone, can they be classified as belonging to a 
specific source of risk, or is the ordering of the subheadings important?  Researchers 
interested in this line of inquiry might also work with researchers in computer science or 
management information systems to develop a simple and parsimonious way to extract 
complete cases for each company-year combination so that they can be readily analyzed.  
The developers at DirectEdgar have begun to look at these issues but much more work 
remains. 
 A fourth avenue of future research results from the findings uncovered in this 
analysis.  While there was some support for hypothesis three, more research could be 
done on understanding how managers classify risks – what categories do they use and 
why.  Perhaps the categories we have come up with in organizational research like 
operational (Wiseman & Catanach, 1997), strategic (Collins & Ruefli, 1992) and 
financial (Miller, 1998) have different meanings for managers than we prescribe to them.  
Or perhaps, they use a much more detailed or broad classification system (such as 
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internal versus external).  Further, research could also explore, from a theoretical 
perspective, why attention to internal risks and external risks results in different 
likelihoods for experiencing risk events.  Why is it that more focus on external risks 
resulted in a decreased likelihood while focus on internal risks increased the likelihood of 
experiencing an event?  Do managerial characteristics have something to do with this 
(e.g. locus of control or overconfidence)?   
 Finally, future research could explore in more detail the situations in which 
information disclosures are poor predictors of company action, thus challenging tenets of 
attention-based research.  For instance, while the ABV suggests that action will be 
initiated as a result of greater attention directed towards a stimulus, other theoretical 
perspectives such as signaling theory (Spence, 1974), might suggest that information 
disclosures are used more for reducing information asymmetry and sending a signal to 
outsiders about qualitative firm qualities such as riskiness.  In this study, perhaps greater 
attention actually signals to outsiders a heightened level of risk associated with the 
company‘s environment.   
 It is also possible, although fairly cynical, that companies who are more risky 
actually disclose as much as they can to (A) avoid legal ramifications should something 
happen and they not take action; or (B) to ―bury the lead.‖  As Rawlins (2008) has 
suggested, disclosure without transparency can serve to confuse as opposed to 
"enlighten" when it comes to releasing information.  Essentially, the organization may be 
"burying the lead" by including so much information about risk that nobody knows which 
is particularly worrisome and which is particularly benign.  This can serve to give the 
organization cover in case a 'risk event' was to occur.  Either way, future research could 
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explore when information disclosures are good predictors of company action and when 
they are simply used to send a signal. 
Conclusion 
In closing, this study makes several contributions to existing research streams.  First, this 
study makes a contribution to research on managerial cognition and attention (Ocasio, 
1997).  While the analysis did not find support for the contention that greater attention to 
risk would result in a decreased likelihood of experiencing a risk event, results did 
uncover some relationships which extend what we know about attention.  Greater 
attention diversity for instance, resulted in a decreased likelihood of experiencing a risk 
event.  Although managers have limited attention resources, a more holistic approach to 
exploring potential risks has important benefits.  This may be due in fact to having fewer 
'risk blindspots' and thus a more complete picture of their environment.  Additionally, 
results also suggest that managerial attention results in different outcomes dependent 
upon whether that attention is directed at the company's internal or external environment.  
This suggests a much more complex relationship between attention and firm outcomes 
than previously found. 
 A second contribution this study makes is in the use of section 1A of the 10-K as 
a data source.  As of the initiation of this study, no published research in the field of 
management had used this data source to test theory.  While recent research in areas like 
Finance and Accounting have just started to explore this data, this study provides 
evidence of its utility.  By finding significant relationships between variables created 
from this data and an important firm level outcome, my research serves as validation that 
this section of the 10-K may provide important data that our field has yet to take 
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advantage of.  Furthermore, this section of the 10-K may be particularly important as we 
further refine what we know, as well as theory, about risk and how managers perceive 
risk in their environments. 
 To conclude, the purpose of this dissertation was to examine the determinants of 
"harmful surprises" or better termed, risk events.  While the popular press is littered with 
examples and stories about companies that have failed to address risk in substantive 
ways, others have managed to avoid experiencing these harmful events.  In this study, the 
intent was to look at potential resources that might tell us something about how 
companies attempt to manage and stave off risk.  Two such resources posited in the 
literature from both management and finance are financial resources and managerial 
resources.  While the results were not as supportive as hoped for, they do provide some 
optimism in terms of the importance of managerial cognition as it relates to risk.  There 
are a number of future research opportunities as a result of this study and my hope is that 
research on risk, and risk management, will benefit from an increased scrutiny of new 
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Table 2.  Correlation Matrix 
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.  Experience Event 0.0179 0.1236 1 
     2.  General Event 0.0075 0.0861 0.6422* 1 
    3.  Competitive Event 0.0071 0.0838 0.6249* 0.2664* 1 
   4.  Operational Event 0.0052 0.0722 0.5375* 0.2998* 0.3202* 1 
  5.  Strategic Event 0.0025 0.0497 0.3690* 0.1215* 0.1337* 0.1264* 1 
 6.  Financial (Internal) Event 0.0007 0.0268 0.1985* 0.0911* 0.0937* 0.0537* 0.1335* 1 
7.  Financial (External) Event 0.0030 0.0551 0.4096* 0.3052* 0.1662* 0.1763* 0.0758* 0.0714* 
8.  Legal Event 0.0010 0.0322 0.2390* 0.0619* 0.1036* 0.1210* 0.0880* 0.0407* 
9.  Other Event 0.0006 0.0247 0.1830* 0.1329* 0.1714* 0.1190* 0.0280* -0.0007 
10. Available Slack 1.8067 1.1382 0.0106 0.0000 0.0174* 0.0105 0.0075 -0.0018 
11. Attention to Risk 4659.4320 3201.5380 0.0266* 0.0047 0.0251* 0.0120 0.0219* -0.0037 
12. Attention Diversity 0.8042 0.1469 0.0022 0.0044 0.0060 -0.0075 0.0110 -0.0057 
13. General Headings  4.2969 2.7188 -0.0016 -0.0079 0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0083 -0.0136 
14. Competitive Headings 4.2664 2.8034 0.0286* 0.0144 0.0285* 0.0208* 0.0138 -0.0095 
15. Operational Headings 5.6248 3.2499 0.0260* 0.0125 0.0086 0.0163* 0.0295* -0.0061 
16. Strategic Headings  1.5091 1.7778 0.0127 -0.0093 0.0031 0.0042 0.0177* 0.0025 
17. Financial (Internal) Headings 2.2373 2.2939 0.0017 0.0001 0.0073 -0.0076 0.0021 -0.0046 
18. Financial (External) Headings 1.3608 1.3473 -0.0038 0.0029 -0.0067 -0.0051 -0.0010 -0.0006 
19. Legal Headings  2.4913 2.0277 0.0145* 0.0019 0.0124 0.0153* 0.0160* -0.0154* 
20.  Other Headings  0.5042 0.7399 -0.0244* -0.0081 -0.0165* -0.0202* -0.0104 -0.0014 
21. Firm Size (assets) 23779.2300 50518.6300 -0.0228* -0.0097 -0.0177* -0.0125* -0.0098 -0.0038 
22. Firm Performance (RoA) 0.0544 0.0977 -0.0215* -0.0079 -0.0222* -0.0112 -0.0178* -0.0116 
23. Equity Price Risk  0.0220 0.0155 0.0866* 0.0628* 0.0252* 0.0226* 0.0294* 0.0335* 
         *Denotes the correlation is significant at the .05 level of analysis 




Table 2 (continued) 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
           
           
           
           
           
           1 
          0.0588* 1 
         0.0513* 0.0443* 1 
        -0.0107 0.0013 0.0024 1 
       -0.0068 0.0140* -0.0005 0.1822* 1 
      0.0031 -0.0122 -0.0040 0.0713* 0.4449* 1 
     -0.0081 0.0134 0.0003 -0.0626* 0.4569* 0.3203* 1 
    -0.0016 -0.0025 0.0036 0.2923* 0.5528* 0.2802* 0.2430* 1 
   0.0007 0.0013 0.0043 0.0806* 0.6155* 0.4013* 0.3251* 0.4832* 1 
  -0.0059 0.0063 -0.0145* 0.0032 0.3513* 0.3017* 0.2803* 0.2061* 0.2726* 1 
 -0.0082 0.0016 0.0057 0.0089 0.5902* 0.4498* 0.4228* 0.2472* 0.4212* 0.2817* 1 
0.0131 -0.0039 0.0042 -0.1270* 0.2571* 0.4542* 0.3913* 0.0911* 0.2698* 0.1469* 0.3700* 
-0.0008 0.0075 -0.0062 0.2052* 0.5560* 0.3369* 0.3726* 0.4108* 0.4488* 0.3096* 0.3796* 
-0.0003 -0.0158* 0.0056 -0.0702* 0.1630* 0.4717* 0.2943* 0.0390* 0.1656* 0.0530* 0.2819* 
-0.0117 -0.0030 -0.0059 -0.2105* -0.0595* -0.0915* 0.0210* -0.1209* -0.0953* -0.0181* -0.0654* 
-0.0002 -0.0052 0.0043 0.1125* -0.1263* -0.0809* -0.0680* -0.0465* -0.0277* -0.0885* -0.1886* 






Table 2 (continued) 
18 19 20 21 22 23 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      1 
     0.1112* 1 
    0.3339* 0.0561* 1 
   -0.0043 -0.0994* -0.0092 1 
  -0.0757* -0.0368* 0.0089 0.0134* 1 

















         Firm Size -0.00001 ** -0.00001 ** -0.00001 ** -0.00001 * 
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Attention to Risk 0.00007 
 
0.00012 ** 0.00004 
 


















































































                 























































































































































































Attention Depth (Internal) 0.07225 *** 












Attention Depth (External) 
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Figure 2.  Section 1a Word Count Differentials  
Industry 1 (Two digit SIC code 35) 
 
 




Appendix 1.  Risk Categories 
Type of Risk Definition Example 10K 
Competitive Risks associated with organization's ability to compete 
(e.g. task, industry and competitive environment) 
 
Example: Industry rivalry or consolidation, reliance on 
few suppliers or customers, etc. 






Risks associated with financial markets and financial 
conditions external to the firm 
 
Example: Changes in interest rates, foreign exchange, 
commodity markets, etc. 
John Deere’s equipment operations and financial services 
segment are subject to interest rate risks. Changes in 
interest rates can reduce demand for equipment, adversely 
affect interest margins and limit the ability to access capital 






Risks associated with financing of the organization 
 
Example: Issuance of debt or equity, ability to meet debt 
obligations, etc.  
"We may be unable to obtain debt to fund our operations 
and contractual commitments at competitive rates, on 
commercially reasonable terms or in sufficient amounts."
5
 
General Risks associated with the macro environment 
 
Example:  Economic conditions, regulatory changes, 
demographic trends, etc. 
"International, national and regional trade laws, 
regulations and policies (particularly those related to or 
restricting global trade) and government farm programs 
and policies, could significantly impair John Deere’s 




Legal Risks associated with operating by rules of society as well 
as corporate governance related 
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 Macy's Department Stores 10-K fiscal year end January 28, 2012 
4
 John Deere 10-K fiscal y ear end October 31, 2012 
5
 Boeing Company 10-K fiscal year end December 31, 2010 
6
 John Deere (see above) 
7




Example: Product liability, lawsuits, fraud, internal 
control, financial restatements, protecting intellectual 
property rights, etc. 
 
Operational Risks associated with the creation and production of the 
good or service 
 
Example: Logistics issues, manufacturing problems, 
human resources, etc. 
"Southwest’s business is labor-intensive; Southwest could 
be adversely affected if it were unable to maintain 




Other Risks which do not fall into the above categories 
 
Example: Natural disasters, weather patterns, etc. 
"John Deere’s business may be directly and indirectly 
affected by unfavorable weather conditions or natural 
disasters that reduce agricultural production and demand 




Strategic Risks associated with executing the company strategy 
 
Example:  Corporate strategy related (mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures), product mix, execution 
issues, etc. 
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 Southwest Airlines 10-K fiscal year end December 31, 2007 
9
 John Deere (see above) 
10
 Microsoft Corporation (see above) 
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Appendix 2.  Examples of Section 1A 
 
Example Section 1A (John Deere, Annual Report Filed 12/18/2008) 
 




Governmental Actions. The Company‘s agricultural business is exposed to a variety of 
risks and uncertainties related to the action or inaction of governmental bodies. The 
outcome of the global negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
could have a material effect on the international flow of agricultural commodities which 
may result in a corresponding effect on the demand for agricultural equipment in many 
areas of the world. The policies of the Brazilian government (including those related to 
exchange rates and commodity prices) and Argentine government could significantly 
change the dynamics of the agricultural economy in South America. With respect to the 
current global economic downturn, changes in governmental banking, monetary and 
fiscal policies to restore liquidity and increase the availability of credit may not be 
effective and could have a material impact on the Company‘s customers and markets. 
  
In addition, to the extent that the Company participates in governmental programs 
designed to address current conditions, both in the U.S. and outside the U.S., there is no 
assurance such programs will remain available for sufficient periods of time or on 
acceptable terms to benefit the Company, and the expiration of such programs could have 
unintended adverse effects. In addition, certain competitors may be eligible for certain 
programs that the Company is ineligible for, which may create a competitive 
disadvantage. 
  
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the ―EESA‖) was signed into law 
on October 3, 2008 to stabilize and provide liquidity to U.S. financial markets. There can 
be no assurance as to the actual impact of the implementing regulations of the EESA, or 
any other governmental program, on the financial markets. The Company‘s business, 
financial condition, results of operations, access to credit, and trading price of common 
stock could be materially and adversely affected if the financial markets fail to stabilize, 
or if current financial market conditions worsen.  
 
The Company may also become subject to additional restrictions pursuant to participation 
in the EESA‘s specific programs. For example, John Deere‘s participation in the FDIC 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program will require the payment of certain fees to the 
FDIC. The costs of participation or non-participation in any such program, as well as the 
effect of such programs on the Company‘s results of operations, cannot be reliably 
determined at this time. 
  
Changing Demand for Farm Outputs. Changing worldwide demand for food and the 
demand for different forms of bio-energy could have an effect on prices for farm 
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commodities and consequently the demand for the Company‘s agricultural equipment. In 
addition, global economic conditions may have an impact on commodity prices. 
  
Globalization. The continuing globalization of agricultural businesses may significantly 
change the dynamics of the Company‘s competition, customer base and product 
offerings. The Company‘s efforts to grow its businesses depend to a large extent on 
access to, and its success in developing market share and operating profitably in, 
additional geographic markets including but not limited to Brazil, Russia, India and 
China. In some cases, these countries have greater political and economic volatility and 
greater vulnerability to infrastructure and labor disruptions. Operating in a large number 
of different regions and countries exposes the Company to multiple regulatory 
requirements that are subject to change; increased exposure to currency fluctuations; 
differing local product preferences and product requirements; differing labor regulations 
and differing tax laws. Simultaneously, these emerging markets are becoming more 
competitive as other international companies grow globally and local low cost 
manufacturers expand their production capacities. 
  
Economic Condition and Outlook. Recent significant changes in market liquidity 
conditions could impact access to funding and associated funding costs, which could 
reduce the Company‘s earnings and cash flows. The Company‘s investment management 
operations could be adversely impacted by changes in the equity and bond markets, 
which would negatively affect earnings. General economic conditions can affect the 
demand for the Company‘s equipment. Current negative economic conditions and 
outlook have decreased housing starts and other construction and dampened demand for 
certain construction equipment. The Company‘s commercial and consumer equipment 
and construction and forestry segments are dependent on construction activity and 
general economic conditions. A significant or prolonged decline in construction activity 
and housing starts could have a material adverse effect on the Company‘s results of 
operations if current economic difficulties, as well as depressed housing markets, 
continue into the foreseeable future. If current economic conditions extend to the overall 
farm economy, there could be a similar effect on agricultural equipment sales. 
  
The volatility in global financial markets has reached unprecedented levels. Global 
financial market downturns began in the second half of 2007, and significantly increased 
during the fourth quarter of 2008. Volatile oil prices, falling equity market values, 
declining business, weakened consumer confidence, and risks of increased inflation and 
deflation and increased unemployment rates have created fears of a severe recession. 
Conditions in the global financial markets and general economy materially affect the 
Company‘s results of operations. The demand for the Company‘s products and services 
could be adversely affected in an economic crisis characterized by higher unemployment, 
lower consumer spending, lower corporate earnings, and lower business investment. 
  
Currency Fluctuations. The reporting currency for the Company‘s consolidated financial 
statements is the U.S. dollar. Certain of the Company‘s assets, liabilities, expenses and 
revenues are denominated in other countries‘ currencies. Those assets, liabilities, 
expenses and revenues are translated into U.S. dollars at the applicable exchange rates to 
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prepare the Company‘s consolidated financial statements. Therefore, increases or 
decreases in exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and those other currencies affect the 
value of those items as reflected in the Company‘s consolidated financial statements, 
even if their value remains unchanged in their original currency. Substantial fluctuations 
in the value of the U.S. dollar could have a continuing and significant impact on the 
Company‘s results. 
  
Risks to Financial Services Segment. The current economic downturn and market 
volatility have adversely affected the financial industry in which the credit segment 
operates. The credit segment provides financing to a significant portion of John Deere 
sales worldwide. The credit segment‘s inability to access funds to support its financing 
activities to the Company‘s customers could have a material adverse effect on the 
Company‘s business. The credit segment‘s liquidity and ongoing profitability depend 
largely on timely access to capital to meet future cash flow requirements and fund 
operations and the costs associated with engaging in diversified funding activities. In 
recent weeks, the credit markets have reached unprecedented levels of volatility, resulting 
in reduced levels of liquidity and disruption of domestic and foreign financial markets. If 
current levels of market disruption and volatility continue or worsen, funding could be 
unavailable or insufficient. Additionally, under current market conditions customer 
confidence levels may result in declines in credit applications and increases in 
delinquencies and default rates, which could materially impact the credit segment‘s write-
offs and provisions for credit losses. 
  
Consumer Attitudes. The confidence the Company‘s customers have in the general 
economic outlook can have a significant effect on their propensity to purchase equipment 
and, consequently, on the Company‘s sales. Current negative economic conditions could 
significantly impair customer confidence. The Company‘s ability to match its new 
product offerings to its customers‘ anticipated preferences for enhanced technologies and 
different types and sizes of equipment is important as well. 
   
Weather. Poor or unusual weather conditions, particularly in the spring, can significantly 
affect the purchasing decisions of the Company‘s customers, particularly the customers 
of the agricultural and commercial and consumer segments. Sales in the important spring 
selling season can have a dramatic effect on the commercial and consumer segment‘s 
financial results. 
  
Supply Base and Raw Material Costs. Many of the Company‘s suppliers also supply the 
automotive industry. The severe downturn in automotive sales and the weak financial 
condition of some major automakers could cause these suppliers to face severe financial 
hardship and disrupt the Company‘s access to critical components. Changes in the 
availability and price of raw materials, which are more likely to occur during times of 
economic volatility, could have a material negative impact on the Company‘s costs of 
production and, in turn, on the profitability of the business. 
  
Interest Rates and Credit Ratings. If interest rates rise, they could have a dampening 
effect on overall economic activity and could affect the demand for the Company‘s 
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equipment. In addition, credit market dislocations could have an impact on funding costs 
which are very important to the Company‘s credit segment. Decisions and actions by 
credit rating agencies can affect the availability and cost of funding for the Company. 
Credit rating downgrades or negative changes to ratings outlooks can increase the 
Company‘s cost of capital and hurt its competitive position. Guidance from rating 
agencies as to acceptable leverage can affect the Company‘s returns as well. 
  
Environmental. The Company‘s operations are subject to and affected by environmental, 
health and safety laws and regulations by federal, state and local authorities in the United 
States and regulatory authorities with jurisdiction over the Company‘s foreign operations. 
Violations of such laws or regulations can lead to investigation and remediation costs, 
significant fines or penalties. In addition, increased requirements of governmental 
authorities, and claims for damages to property or injury to persons resulting from the 
environmental, health or safety impacts of the Company‘s operations or past 
contamination, could prevent or restrict the Company‘s operations, require significant 
expenditures to achieve compliance, involve the imposition of cleanup liens and/or give 
rise to civil or criminal liability. There can be no assurance that violations of such 
legislation and/or regulations, which could result in enforcement actions or private claims 
would not have consequences that result in a material adverse effect on the Company‘s 
business, financial condition or results of operations. 
  
Climate Change. There is a growing political and scientific consensus that emissions of 
greenhouse gases (―GHG‖) continue to alter the composition of the global atmosphere in 
ways that are affecting and are expected to continue affecting the global climate. Various 
stakeholders, including legislators and regulators, shareholders and non-governmental 
organizations, as well as companies in many business sectors are considering ways to 
reduce GHG emissions. There is growing consensus that some form of regulation will be 
forthcoming at the federal level with respect to greenhouse gas emissions and such 
regulation could result in the creation of additional costs in the form of taxes or emission 
allowances. The impact of any future mandatory GHG legislative or regulatory 
requirements on the Company‘s businesses and products is dependent on the design of 
the mandate, and so the Company is unable to predict its significance at this time. 
  
Furthermore, the potential physical impacts of climate change on the Company‘s 
customers, and therefore on the Company‘s operations, are highly uncertain, and will be 
particular to the circumstances developing in various geographical regions. These may 
include changes in weather patterns (including drought and rainfall levels), water 
availability, storm patterns and intensities, and temperature levels. These potential 
physical effects may adversely impact the cost, production and financial performance of 
John Deere‘s operations. 
  
The risks identified above should be considered in conjunction with Management‘s 
Discussion and Analysis beginning on page 15 and, specifically, the other risks described 
in the Safe Harbor Statement on pages 17 and 18. The Company‘s results of operations 
may be affected by these identified risks and/or by risks not currently contemplated. 
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Example Section 1A (Microsoft Corporation, Annual Report Filed 07/28/2011) 
 
ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS
12
  
Our operations and financial results are subject to various risks and uncertainties, 
including those described below, that could adversely affect our business, financial 
condition, results of operations, cash flows, and the trading price of our common stock.  
The cloud-based computing model presents execution and competitive risks.    We 
are transitioning our strategy to a computing environment characterized by cloud-based 
services used with smart client devices. Our competitors are rapidly developing and 
deploying cloud-based services for consumers and business customers. Pricing and 
delivery models are evolving. Devices and form factors influence how users access 
services in the cloud. We are devoting significant resources to develop and deploy our 
own competing cloud-based software plus services strategies. While we believe our 
expertise, investments in infrastructure, and the breadth of our cloud-based services 
provides us with a strong foundation to compete, it is uncertain whether our strategies 
will attract the users or generate the revenue required to be successful. In addition to 
software development costs, we are incurring costs to build and maintain infrastructure to 
support cloud computing services. These costs may reduce the operating margins we 
have previously achieved. Whether we are successful in this new business model depends 
on our execution in a number of areas, including:  
  
  
•   continuing to innovate and bring to market compelling cloud-based experiences 
that generate increasing traffic and market share;  
  
  
•   maintaining the utility, compatibility, and performance of our cloud-based 
services on the growing array of computing devices, including smartphones, 
handheld computers, netbooks, tablets, and television set top devices;  
  
  
•   continuing to enhance the attractiveness of our cloud platforms to third-party 
developers; and  
  
  
•   ensuring that our cloud services meet the reliability expectations of our customers 
and maintain the security of their data.  
 
Challenges to our business models may reduce our revenue or operating 
margins.    Whether our software runs in the cloud or on a device, we continue to face 
challenges from alternative means of developing and licensing software. Under our 
license-based software model, software developers bear the costs of converting original 
ideas into software products through investments in research and development, offsetting 
these costs with the revenue received from the distribution of their products. Certain 
―open source‖ software business models challenge our license-based software model. 
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 Formatted to show one continuous text as opposed to chopped into multiple page sections as it appears in 
the original 10-K document. 
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Open source commonly refers to software whose source code is subject to a license 
allowing it to be modified, combined with other software and redistributed, subject to 
restrictions set forth in the license. Some companies compete with us using an open 
source business model by modifying and then distributing open source software to end 
users at nominal cost and earning revenue on complementary services and products. 
These firms do not bear the full costs of research and development for the software. In 
some cases, their products may infringe our patents. In addition, advertising-based 
business models seek revenue by delivering third party advertisements to end customers 
who receive the software and services at no direct costs. Gains in market acceptance of 
open source or advertising based software may adversely affect our sales, revenue, and 
operating margins.  
An important element of our business model has been to create platform-based 
ecosystems on which many participants can build diverse solutions. A competing 
vertically-integrated model, in which a single firm controls both the software and 
hardware elements of a product, has been successful with certain consumer products such 
as personal computers, mobile phones, and digital music players. We also offer 
vertically-integrated hardware and software products; however, efforts to compete with 
the vertically integrated model may increase our cost of sales and reduce our operating 
margins.  
We derive substantial revenue from licenses of Windows operating systems on personal 
computers. The proliferation of alternative devices and form factors creates challenges 
from competing software platforms. It is uncertain to what extent alternative devices will 
increase the number of computing devices that users own, or will substitute for users‘ 
personal computer purchases. Alternative devices also run operating systems and 
applications developed by our competitors. These factors could impact our revenue and 
margins.  
We face intense competition.    We continue to experience intense competition across 
all markets for our products and services. Our competitors range in size from Fortune 100 
companies to small, specialized single-product businesses and open source community-
based projects. Although we believe the breadth of our businesses and product portfolio 
is a competitive advantage, our competitors that are focused on narrower product lines 
may be more effective in devoting technical, marketing, and financial resources to 
compete with us. In addition, barriers to entry in our businesses generally are low and 
products, once developed, can be distributed broadly and quickly at relatively low cost. 
Open source software vendors are devoting considerable efforts to developing software 
that mimics the features and functionality of our products, in some cases in violation of 
our intellectual property rights or on the basis of technical specifications for Microsoft 
technologies that we make available at little or no cost in connection with our 
interoperability initiatives. In response to competition, we continue to develop versions of 
our products with basic functionality that are sold at lower prices than the standard 
versions. These competitive pressures may result in decreased sales volumes, price 
reductions, and/or increased operating costs, such as for marketing and sales incentives, 
resulting in lower revenue, gross margins, and operating income.  
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We may not be able to adequately protect our intellectual property 
rights.    Protecting our global intellectual property rights and combating unlicensed 
copying and use of software and other intellectual property is difficult. While piracy 
adversely affects U.S. revenue, the impact on revenue from outside the U.S. is more 
significant, particularly in countries where laws are less protective of intellectual property 
rights. As a result, our revenue in these markets likely will grow slower than the 
underlying PC market. Similarly, the absence of harmonized patent laws makes it more 
difficult to ensure consistent respect for patent rights. Throughout the world, we actively 
educate consumers about the benefits of licensing genuine products and obtaining 
indemnification benefits for intellectual property risks, and we educate lawmakers about 
the advantages of a business climate where intellectual property rights are protected. 
However, continued educational and enforcement efforts may fail to enhance revenue. 
Reductions in the legal protection for software intellectual property rights could 
adversely affect revenue.  
Third parties may claim we infringe their intellectual property rights.    From time to 
time, we receive notices from others claiming we infringe their intellectual property 
rights. Because of constant technological change in the segments in which we compete, 
the extensive patent coverage of existing technologies, and the rapid rate of issuance of 
new patents, it is possible the number of these claims may grow. To resolve these claims 
we may enter into royalty and licensing agreements on less favorable terms, stop selling 
or redesign affected products, or pay damages to satisfy indemnification commitments 
with our customers. Such agreements may cause operating margins to decline. We have 
made and expect to continue making significant expenditures to settle claims related to 
the use of technology and intellectual property rights as part of our strategy to manage 
this risk.  
We may not be able to protect our source code from copying if there is an 
unauthorized disclosure of source code.    Source code, the detailed program 
commands for our operating systems and other software programs, is critical to our 
business. Although we license portions of our application and operating system source 
code to a number of licensees, we take significant measures to protect the secrecy of large 
portions of our source code. If an unauthorized disclosure of a significant portion of our 
source code occurs, we could potentially lose future trade secret protection for that source 
code. This could make it easier for third parties to compete with our products by copying 
functionality, which could adversely affect our revenue and operating margins. 
Unauthorized disclosure of source code also could increase the security risks described in 
the next paragraph.  
Security vulnerabilities could lead to reduced revenue, liability claims, or 
competitive harm.    Maintaining the security of computers and computer networks is 
paramount for us and our customers. Hackers develop and deploy viruses, worms, and 
other malicious software programs that attack our products and services and gain access 
to our networks and data centers. Although this is an industry-wide problem that affects 
computers across all platforms, it affects our products and services in particular because 
hackers tend to focus their efforts on the most popular operating systems, programs, and 
services, and we expect them to continue to do so. Groups of hackers may also act in a 
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coordinated manner to launch distributed denial of service attacks, or other coordinated 
attacks, that may cause service outages or other interruptions. We devote significant 
resources to address security vulnerabilities through:  
  
  •   engineering more secure products and services;  
  
  
•   enhancing security and reliability features in our products and services, and 
continuously evaluating and updating those security and reliability features;  
  
  
•   helping our customers make the best use of our products and services to protect 
against computer viruses and other attacks;  
  
  •   improving the deployment of software updates to address security vulnerabilities;  
  
  
•   investing in mitigation technologies that help to secure customers from attacks 
even when such software updates are not deployed; and  
  
  
•   providing customers online automated security tools, published security guidance, 
and security software such as firewalls and anti-virus software.  
The cost of these steps could reduce our operating margins. Despite these efforts, actual 
or perceived security vulnerabilities in our products and services could cause significant 
reputational harm and lead some customers to seek to return products, to reduce or delay 
future purchases or adoption of services, or to use competing products. Customers may 
also increase their expenditures on protecting their existing computer systems from 
attack, which could delay adoption of new technologies. Any of these actions by 
customers could adversely affect our revenue. Actual or perceived vulnerabilities may 
lead to claims against us. Although our license agreements typically contain provisions 
that eliminate or limit our exposure to such liability, there is no assurance these 
provisions will withstand all legal challenges.  
In addition, our internal information technology environment continues to evolve. We are 
often early adopters of new devices and technologies. We embrace new ways of sharing 
data and communicating with partners and customers using methods such as social 
networking. These practices can enhance efficiency and business insight, but they also 
present risks that our business policies and internal security controls may not keep pace 
with the speed of these changes. If third parties gain access to our networks or data 
centers, they could obtain and exploit confidential business information and harm our 
competitive position.  
   
Improper disclosure of personal data could result in liability and harm our 
reputation.    As we continue to execute our strategy of increasing the number and scale 
of our cloud-based offerings, we store and process increasingly large amounts of 
personally identifiable information of our customers. At the same time, the continued 
occurrence of high-profile data breaches provides evidence of an external environment 
increasingly hostile to information security. This environment demands that we 
continuously improve our design and coordination of security controls across our 
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business groups and geographies. Despite these efforts, it is possible our security controls 
over personal data, our training of employees and vendors on data security, and other 
practices we follow may not prevent the improper disclosure of personally identifiable 
information. Improper disclosure of this information could harm our reputation, lead to 
legal exposure to customers, or subject us to liability under laws that protect personal 
data, resulting in increased costs or loss of revenue. Our software products and services 
also enable our customers to store and process personal data on premises or, increasingly, 
in a cloud-based environment we host. We believe consumers using our email, 
messaging, storage, sharing, and social networking services will increasingly want 
efficient, centralized methods of choosing their privacy preferences and controlling their 
data. Perceptions that our products or services do not adequately protect the privacy of 
personal information could inhibit sales of our products or services, and could constrain 
consumer and business adoption of cloud-based solutions.  
We may experience outages, data loss and disruptions of our online services if we 
fail to maintain an adequate operations infrastructure.    Our increasing user traffic 
and complexity of our products and services demand more computing power. We have 
spent and expect to continue to spend substantial amounts to purchase or lease data 
centers and equipment and to upgrade our technology and network infrastructure to 
handle increased traffic on our Web sites and in our data centers, and to introduce new 
products and services and support existing services such as Bing, Exchange Online, 
Office 365, SharePoint Online, Xbox LIVE, Windows Azure, Windows Live, and 
Microsoft Office Web Apps. We also are growing our business of providing a platform 
and back-end hosting for services provided by third-party businesses to their end 
customers. Maintaining and expanding this infrastructure is expensive and complex. 
Inefficiencies or operational failures, including temporary or permanent loss of customer 
data, could diminish the quality of our products, services, and user experience resulting in 
contractual liability, claims by customers and other third parties, damage to our 
reputation and loss of current and potential users, subscribers, and advertisers, each of 
which may harm our operating results and financial condition.  
We are subject to government litigation and regulatory activity that affects how we 
design and market our products.    As a leading global software maker, we receive 
close scrutiny from government agencies under U.S. and foreign competition laws. Some 
jurisdictions also provide private rights of action for competitors or consumers to assert 
claims of anti-competitive conduct. For example, we have been involved in the following 
actions.  
Lawsuits brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, 18 states, and the District of 
Columbia in two separate actions were resolved through a Consent Decree that took 
effect in 2001 and a Final Judgment entered in 2002. These proceedings imposed various 
constraints on our Windows operating system businesses. These constraints included 
limits on certain contracting practices, mandated disclosure of certain software program 
interfaces and protocols, and rights for computer manufacturers to limit the visibility of 
certain Windows features in new PCs. Although the Consent Decree and Final Judgment 
expired in May 2011, we expect that federal and state antitrust authorities will continue to 
closely scrutinize our business.  
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The European Commission closely scrutinizes the design of high-volume Microsoft 
products and the terms on which we make certain technologies used in these products, 
such as file formats, programming interfaces, and protocols, available to other 
companies. In 2004, the Commission ordered us to create new versions of Windows that 
do not include certain multimedia technologies and to provide our competitors with 
specifications for how to implement certain proprietary Windows communications 
protocols in their own products. In 2009, the Commission accepted a set of commitments 
offered by Microsoft to address the Commission‘s concerns relating to competition in 
Web browsing software. The Commission‘s impact on product design may limit our 
ability to innovate in Windows or other products in the future, diminish the developer 
appeal of the Windows platform, and increase our product development costs. The 
availability of licenses related to protocols and file formats may enable competitors to 
develop software products that better mimic the functionality of our own products which 
could result in decreased sales of our products.  
   
Government regulatory actions and court decisions such as these may hinder our ability 
to provide the benefits of our software to consumers and businesses, thereby reducing the 
attractiveness of our products and the revenue that come from them. New actions could 
be initiated at any time, either by these or other governments or private claimants, 
including with respect to new versions of Windows or other Microsoft products. The 
outcome of such actions, or steps taken to avoid them, could adversely affect us in a 
variety of ways, including:  
  
  
•   We may have to choose between withdrawing products from certain geographies 
to avoid fines or designing and developing alternative versions of those products 
to comply with government rulings, which may entail a delay in a product release 
and removing functionality that customers want or on which developers rely.  
  
  
•   We may be required to make available licenses to our proprietary technologies on 
terms that do not reflect their fair market value or do not protect our associated 
intellectual property.  
  
  
•   The rulings described above may be used as precedent in other competition law 
proceedings.  
Our software and services online offerings are subject to government regulation of the 
Internet domestically and internationally in many areas, including user privacy, 
telecommunications, data protection, and online content. The application of these laws 
and regulations to our business is often unclear and sometimes may conflict. Compliance 
with these regulations may involve significant costs or require changes in business 
practices that result in reduced revenue. Noncompliance could result in penalties being 
imposed on us or orders that we stop the alleged noncompliant activity.  
Our business depends on our ability to attract and retain talented employees.    Our 
business is based on successfully attracting and retaining talented employees. The market 
for highly skilled workers and leaders in our industry is extremely competitive. We are 
limited in our ability to recruit internationally by restrictive domestic immigration laws. 
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If we are less successful in our recruiting efforts, or if we are unable to retain key 
employees, our ability to develop and deliver successful products and services may be 
adversely affected. Effective succession planning is also important to our long-term 
success. Failure to ensure effective transfer of knowledge and smooth transitions 
involving key employees could hinder our strategic planning and execution.  
Delays in product development schedules may adversely affect our revenue.    The 
development of software products is a complex and time-consuming process. New 
products and enhancements to existing products can require long development and testing 
periods. Our increasing focus on cloud-based software plus services also presents new 
and complex development issues. Significant delays in new product or service releases or 
significant problems in creating new products or services could adversely affect our 
revenue.  
We make significant investments in new products and services that may not be 
profitable.    Our growth depends on our ability to innovate by offering new, and adding 
value to our existing, software and service offerings. We will continue to make 
significant investments in research, development, and marketing for new products, 
services, and technologies, including the Windows PC operating system, the Microsoft 
Office system, Bing, Windows Phone, Windows Server, Windows Live, the Windows 
Azure Services platform and other cloud-based services offerings, and the Xbox 360 
entertainment platform. Investments in new technology are speculative. Commercial 
success depends on many factors, including innovativeness, developer support, and 
effective distribution and marketing. Our degree of success with Windows Phone, for 
example, will impact our ability to grow our share of the smartphone operating system 
market. It will also be an important factor in supporting our strategy of delivering value 
to end users seamlessly over PC, phone, and TV device classes. If customers do not 
perceive our latest offerings as providing significant new functionality or other value, 
they may reduce their purchases of new software products or upgrades, unfavorably 
impacting revenue. We may not achieve significant revenue from new product and 
service investments for a number of years, if at all. Moreover, new products and services 
may not be profitable, and even if they are profitable, operating margins for new products 
and businesses may not be as high as the margins we have experienced historically.  
Adverse economic conditions may harm our business.    Unfavorable changes in 
economic conditions, including inflation, recession, or other changes in economic 
conditions, may result in lower information technology spending and adversely affect our 
revenue. If demand for PCs, servers, and other computing devices declines, or consumer 
or business spending for those products declines, our revenue will be adversely 
affected. Our product distribution system also relies on an extensive partner network. The 
impact of economic conditions on our partners, such as the bankruptcy of a major 
distributor, could result in sales channel disruption. Challenging economic conditions 
also may impair the ability of our customers to pay for products and services they have 
purchased. As a result, reserves for doubtful accounts and write-offs of accounts 
receivable may increase. We maintain an investment portfolio of various holdings, types, 
and maturities. These investments are subject to general credit, liquidity, market, and 
interest rate risks, which may be exacerbated by unusual events that have affected global 
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financial markets. A significant part of our investment portfolio consists of U.S. 
government securities. If global credit and equity markets experience prolonged periods 
of decline, or if the U.S. federal government budget process results in a default or 
downgrade of its debt, our investment portfolio may be adversely impacted and we could 
determine that more of our investments have experienced an other-than-temporary 
decline in fair value, requiring impairment charges that could adversely impact our 
financial results.  
We have claims and lawsuits against us that may result in adverse outcomes.    We 
are subject to a variety of claims and lawsuits. Adverse outcomes in some or all of these 
claims may result in significant monetary damages or injunctive relief that could 
adversely affect our ability to conduct our business. Although management currently 
believes resolving all of these matters, individually or in the aggregate, will not have a 
material adverse impact on our financial statements, the litigation and other claims are 
subject to inherent uncertainties and management‘s view of these matters may change in 
the future. A material adverse impact on our financial statements also could occur for the 
period in which the effect of an unfavorable final outcome becomes probable and 
reasonably estimable.  
We may have additional tax liabilities.    We are subject to income taxes in the U.S. 
and many foreign jurisdictions. Significant judgment is required in determining our 
worldwide provision for income taxes. In the ordinary course of our business, there are 
many transactions and calculations where the ultimate tax determination is uncertain. We 
regularly are under audit by tax authorities. Although we believe our tax estimates are 
reasonable, the final determination of tax audits and any related litigation could be 
materially different from our historical income tax provisions and accruals. The results of 
an audit or litigation could have a material effect on our financial statements in the period 
or periods for which that determination is made.  
We earn a significant amount of our operating income from outside the U.S., and any 
repatriation of funds currently held in foreign jurisdictions may result in higher effective 
tax rates for the company. In addition, there have been proposals to change U.S. tax laws 
that would significantly impact how U.S. multinational corporations are taxed on foreign 
earnings. Although we cannot predict whether or in what form this proposed legislation 
may pass, if enacted it could have a material adverse impact on our tax expense and cash 
flow.  
Our vertically-integrated hardware and software products may experience quality 
or supply problems.    Our hardware products such as the Xbox 360 console are highly 
complex and can have defects in design, manufacture, or associated software. We could 
incur significant expenses, lost revenue, and reputational harm if we fail to detect or 
effectively address such issues through design, testing, or warranty repairs. We obtain 
some components of our hardware devices from sole suppliers. If a component delivery 
from a sole-source supplier is delayed or becomes unavailable or industry shortages 
occur, we may be unable to obtain timely replacement supplies, resulting in reduced 
sales. Either component shortages or excess or obsolete inventory may increase our cost 
of revenue. Xbox 360 consoles are assembled in Asia; disruptions in the supply chain 
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may result in console shortages that would affect our revenue and operating margins. 
These same risks would apply to any other vertically-integrated hardware and software 
products we may offer.  
If our goodwill or amortizable intangible assets become impaired we may be 
required to record a significant charge to earnings.    Under accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States (―U.S. GAAP‖), we review our amortizable 
intangible assets for impairment when events or changes in circumstances indicate the 
carrying value may not be recoverable. Goodwill is tested for impairment at least 
annually. Factors that may be considered a change in circumstances, indicating that the 
carrying value of our goodwill or amortizable intangible assets may not be recoverable, 
include a decline in stock price and market capitalization, reduced future cash flow 
estimates, and slower growth rates in our industry. We may be required to record a 
significant charge in our financial statements during the period in which any impairment 
of our goodwill or amortizable intangible assets is determined, negatively impacting our 
results of operations.  
  
We operate a global business that exposes us to additional risks.    We operate in over 
100 countries and a significant part of our revenue comes from international sales. 
Pressure to make our pricing structure uniform might require that we reduce the sales 
price of our software in the U.S. and other countries. Operations outside the U.S. may be 
affected by changes in trade protection laws, policies and measures, and other regulatory 
requirements affecting trade and investment, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and local laws prohibiting corrupt payments. Emerging markets are a significant focus of 
our international growth strategy. The developing nature of these markets presents a 
number of risks. Deterioration of social, political, labor, or economic conditions in a 
specific country or region and difficulties in staffing and managing foreign operations 
may also adversely affect our operations or financial results. Although we hedge a 
portion of our international currency exposure, significant fluctuations in exchange rates 
between the U.S. dollar and foreign currencies may adversely affect our net revenue.  
Catastrophic events or geo-political conditions may disrupt our business.    A 
disruption or failure of our systems or operations in the event of a major earthquake, 
weather event, cyber-attack, terrorist attack, or other catastrophic event could cause 
delays in completing sales, providing services, or performing other mission-critical 
functions. Our corporate headquarters, a significant portion of our research and 
development activities, and certain other critical business operations are located in the 
Seattle, Washington area, and we have other business operations in the Silicon Valley 
area of California, both of which are near major earthquake faults. A catastrophic event 
that results in the destruction or disruption of any of our critical business or information 
technology systems could harm our ability to conduct normal business operations. Our 
move toward providing our customers with more services and solutions in the cloud puts 
a premium on the resilience of our systems and strength of our business continuity 
management plans, and magnifies the potential impact of prolonged outages on our 
operating results. Abrupt political change, terrorist activity, and armed conflict pose a 
risk of general economic disruption in affected countries, which may increase our 
operating costs. These conditions also may add uncertainty to the timing and budget for 
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technology investment decisions by our customers, and may result in supply chain 
disruptions for hardware manufacturers, either of which may adversely affect our 
revenue. The long-term effects of climate change on the global economy in general or the 
information technology industry in particular are unclear. Environmental regulations or 
changes in the supply, demand or available sources of energy may affect the availability 
or cost of goods and services, including natural resources, necessary to run our business. 
Changes in weather where we operate may increase the costs of powering and cooling 
computer hardware we use to develop software and provide cloud-based services. New 
regulations may require us to find alternative compliant and cost-effective methods of 
distributing our products and services.  
Acquisitions, joint ventures and strategic alliances may have an adverse effect on 
our business.    We expect to continue making acquisitions or entering into joint ventures 
and strategic alliances as part of our long-term business strategy. These transactions 
involve significant challenges and risks including that the transaction does not advance 
our business strategy, that we don‘t realize a satisfactory return on our investment, or that 
we experience difficulty integrating new employees, business systems, and technology, 
or diversion of management‘s attention from our other businesses. It may take longer 
than expected to realize the full benefits, such as increased revenue, enhanced 
efficiencies, or market share, or those benefits may ultimately be smaller than anticipated, 





Appendix 3.  Keywords for Classification 
Competitive 
Key Words: customer demand, rivalry, non-compete, vendor, subscriber, supply chain, 
supplier, suppliers, supplier network, new entrant, barrier to entry, barriers to entry, entry 
barrier, government contract, cyclical, cyclicality, seasonal, seasonality 
 
Financial (External) 
Key Words: equity market, commodity price, foreign exchange, foreign currencies, 
foreign currency, fuel price, oil price, energy price, energy market, credit market, fuel 
cost, energy cost, money market, exchange rate, changes in accounting, coal price, 
natural gas price, gold price, silver price, copper price, accounting standard, market 
volatility, stock market, financial market 
 
Financial (Internal) 
Key Words: counterparty credit, dividend, investment portfolio, restatement, receivables, 
line of credit, hedge, credit rating, hedging, credit facility, credit facilities 
 
General 
Key Words: regulation, regulations, economic condition, economic conditions, taxes, 
government policy, government policies, government regulation, international economic, 
legislation, deferred tax, deferred taxes, global economic, global economy, geo-politics, 
geo-political, geopolitical, inflation, unemployment, housing market, monetary policy, 
fiscal policy, budget deficit, tariff, recession, economic downturn, economic weakness, 
our international operation, health care reform, defense budget, medicare, medicaid, 
terrorism, terrorist, business conditions 
 
Legal 
Key Words: lawsuit, court, internal control, litigate, litigation, fraud, corporate 
governance, settlement, investigation, patent, legal matter, legal proceeding, legal action, 
legal liabilities, legal liability, liability claim, intellectual property, criminal, bribe, 
prosecute, prosecution, copyright, trademark, conflicts of interest, conflict of interest 
 
Operational 
Key Words: outsource, outsourcing, outsources, input cost, human capital, human 
resource, labor, restructure, restructuring, product recall, product safety, product quality, 
cost structure, information system, IT security, employee health, manufacture, 
manufacturing, personnel, technology network, network technology, inventory, 
inventories, product liability, recall, security system, security measure, attract and retain, 
attracting and retaining, research and development, system failure, technology failure, 
union, collective bargaining, productivity, product defect, defective product, breach of 
privacy, breach of security, privacy breach, new product development, product 
development, sales network, sales force, capital expenditure, clinical trial, human trial, 









Key Words: hurricane, weather, natural disaster, earthquake, flood, tornado, typhoon, 
tsunami, climate change, pandemic, virus, disease, disaster, catastrophe, catastrophic 
event, health crisis, epidemic 
 
Strategic 
Key Words: merger, acquisition, joint venture, alliance, partnership, buyout, corporate 








Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Thesis:    ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND MANAGERIAL ATTENTION TO RISK:  










Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Business 
Administration (Management) at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
Oklahoma in July, 2014. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Science in Finance at DePaul 
University, Chicago, IL in 2008. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts in Economics at St. 
Ambrose University, Davenport, IA in 2001. 
 
Experience:   
 
International Trading Group, D.E. Trading Corporation; Jacksonville, FL & 
Glenview, IL (2002-2009).  Senior Derivatives Trader. 
 
American Express Financial Advisors; Davenport, IA (2001-2001).  Personal 
Financial Consultant. 
 
Professional Memberships:   
 
Academy of Management, 2010--present 
Strategic Management Society, 2010--present 
Southern Management Association, 2010--present 
Center for the Advancement of Research Methods, 2009--present 
 
 
 
 
